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INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS AND THE CHRISTIAN WAY OF LIFE

A Syllabus of Questions
for use by Forums and
Discussion Classes

Preliminary Edition



PREPARED BY THE COMMISSION
ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON THE CHRISTIAN WAY OF LIFE

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this syllabus of discussion questions is to promote the serious study and full discussion of international problems in the light of the spirit and teaching of Jesus.

It is hoped that those who believe that the international situation calls for the most thorough-going examination will join in this inquiry, provided that in addition to studying these problems from other points of view they desire to discover the bearings of Jesus' way of life upon international relationships. Besides many who call themselves Christians there will be a number who, while themselves making no formal profession of Christianity, may desire to undertake this study in the belief that mankind might attain a richer human fulfillment if it were possible for nations as well as for individuals to find and follow Jesus' way of life.

The group which has prepared this study outline regard it as wholly tentative and preliminary to a more complete statement, which in turn can be produced only as a result of thought and criticism contributed from groups throughout the country. All groups using this questionnaire are requested, therefore, to send to "The Inquiry," 129 East 52nd Street, New York City: (a) their criticism of this syllabus and full suggestions as to how a more adequate statement of the issues may be compiled; (b) suggestions as to selected readings for use in a second edition; (c) answers to as many of the questions in the syllabus as possible, with a brief summary of the opinion of the individual or a consensus of agreement or disagreement on the part of each group. For some groups or forums the complete work called for by this questionnaire will be impossible. For such it is suggested that a selection be made of those chapters and those questions in each chapter which the group think can be covered most successfully.

This study outline does not purposely avoid any question which is being raised today regarding the relation between Christianity and international problems. On the other hand, the syllabus does not go out as either definitive or exhaustive, first, because the inquiry is by nature a colossal one which cannot be com-

passed in any brief time; second, because any outline designed for informal study groups must exclude a considerable number of possible issues.

The readings added to each chapter were not selected primarily because of the authority of the writers, or because they answer any considerable number of the questions, but rather for their value in vividly lighting up the points which are so illustrated.

THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE CHRISTIAN WAY OF LIFE

The questions in this pamphlet have been framed as a part of an inquiry into the Christian way of life in certain fundamental relationships of today. In the confusion of our international, interracial and economic relationships there are many voices telling us that the solution is to be found at the end of one road or another. Groups of people have organized around theories about the nature of social institutions, the kind of government needed for the world and the way in which the physical necessities of life should be produced and distributed. No one of these groups tell us what we need to know. They do not answer the questions: what is life for? just how should it be lived?

Of the leaders of history One at least made the tremendous assertion that He had an answer to this question. He proposed no theory of government, no scheme for social betterment. Rather Jesus typified and advocated a way of life which He asserted we all could live if we would. Those of us who profess to follow Him may have formally accepted his teachings, yet today we find ourselves sometimes wondering either whether they are true or, if true, whether we are sufficiently intelligent to search out the way of life to which they seem to lead.

In an endeavor to make an honest estimate of the nature of some of the problems of our day and a careful study of the relation of Christianity to these problems it is proposed to hold a National Conference on the Christian Way of Life. Its purpose is to promote the fullest study and discussion of international, racial and industrial problems in the light of the spirit and teachings of Jesus. Both the Conference itself and the period of group study which is to precede it will be a wide-spread conferring together of people of the most varied experiences.

This venture had its origin in a resolution by the administrative committee of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, approving the holding of a National Conference on "the meaning of Christianity for human relationships." A nominating committee was appointed to select a "national committee, of which they shall themselves be members, and to convene it as soon as possible, with the understanding that the national committee shall be wholly free in planning for the Conference and that the Federal Council assumes no responsibility for its findings or for its financial support." From the beginning it has been hoped that the Conference might be on an even broader basis than that of the Federal Council of Churches, including not only members of churches not affiliated with the Federal Council, but also those who, though not regarding themselves as members of any particular church, believe that the following of Jesus' way of life might transform industrial, racial and international relations.

Those who are in sympathy with the program may organize or become members of discussion groups wherever they may be. They may become a living part of the enterprise as they turn back to the central committee either the results to which a given group may come or their criticism of material sent out for study and discussion. Eventually, in addition to one or more revised editions of "International Problems and the Christian Way of Life," pamphlets will be available for group discussion on "Christianity and Industry," "Christianity and Race Relations," "The Church and the Christian Way of Life."

Those who lead discussion groups on these subjects may obtain from the address below a pamphlet on the discussion method which will give suggestions for group leaders.

For the sake of brevity the National Conference on the Christian Way of Life is referred to as "The Inquiry." For further information address "The Inquiry," 129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

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PART I—INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS AND THE INDIVIDUAL CITIZEN

Introductory Considerations

Chapter I. Why study international affairs?¹

1. Why does the average citizen give so little attention to international affairs? Which of these reasons seem to you well-founded; of which are you doubtful?
2. Try to make a list of the international controversies in which your government is engaged at the present time, and state the issues involved in each. (You may want to supplement your own list by seeking information from one or more of the following: a professor of International Law or Government; some international organization of which you may be a member, such as Institute of International Education, Foreign Policy Association, World Peace Foundation, League of Nations Non-Partisan Association, National Council for Prevention of War, Church Peace Union, League of Women Voters. One way to measure the responsiveness of those who control the administration of foreign affairs in this democracy would be to address this inquiry through your Senator to the Secretary of State.)
3. Is it best to leave matters of an international nature to expert people in the government? If so, would you think that matters like the tariff, immigration, the prohibition issue, and the bonus should be left in the hands of the government?

¹It is suggested that the group should not spend much time on Chapter I, but should, perhaps, at the first session move on to Chapter II.

4. If international dealings are to be entrusted to experts, how can the experts be kept responsive to an enlightened public interest and not to influential private interests?
5. In what ways, if he were to acquire it, could a private citizen put his wider knowledge of international affairs into action to help the international situation?
6. To what motives could you appeal to secure the active interest of the average citizen in international affairs?

PART II—THE PRESENT WORLD SITUATION

Chapter II. Is the political situation today conducive to human freedom and progress?

1. What and where are the clearly defined areas of friction in the world? (Note: If possible have a wall map of the world and indicate these areas by coloring the map in the appropriate sections.)
2. What are the outstanding causes of this friction? If matters "take their own course" in these areas would you expect the conditions of tension to increase or to decrease?
3. Do you agree with the theory, sometimes advanced, that the doctrine of "self-determination" is making for instability and danger in world relationships? What is the evidence?
4. Some say that "war weariness" makes a war in the near future an impossibility. What is your opinion? On what is it based?
5. Some claim that the development of high explosives and poison gas makes the discovery of some method of adjusting international strains, other than by war, essential if the destruction of our present civilization is to be prevented. What would you say?
6. Is the new principle of assigning mandates over certain politically backward peoples likely to increase or decrease friction between nations? Why?
7. What bearing, if any, have outstanding international debts and unpaid reparations upon the peace and progress of the world?
8. Do you regard "bolshevism" as a serious menace to the peace and freedom of peoples outside Russia? Why or why not? What about the Fascisti movement?

9. Does closer relationship tend to make nations learn to like each other or does it increase tension?
10. Think back over the discussion. Upon the whole is the situation critical enough to demand that the individual citizen take a hand?

Chapter III. Does the present economic situation make for international friction?

1. What are the estimates as to the destruction of physical property and other wealth as a result of the war? Whose wealth was destroyed?
2. To what extent was productive power curtailed as a result of the war: (a) in man power; (b) in the destruction of the tools of industry; (c) in the dissipation of natural resources; (d) in weakening industrial morale?
3. Is the standard of living lower throughout the world, especially in Europe? Or is this only our mistaken interpretation of a fundamental shift in the possession of wealth from one person to another and from one class to another? Is the state of things improving?
4. How do unemployment and its accompanying unrest compare with 1913? Do industrial questions seem more acute now than then?
5. Where conditions are most severe would you expect people to react in armed protest more quickly or less quickly than a decade ago? Why? Where, if at all, would you expect international strife to break out as the result of severe economic pressure?
6. The scramble for raw materials is considered a contributing cause of war. Did the war tend to increase or to decrease this scramble for raw materials, such as oil, coal, iron and copper? For example, do you find the United States more solicitous or less solicitous about securing natural resources in new areas than before the war? Is there more or less likelihood of war from this cause than before 1914?

7. Does the position of the United States as common creditor to many debtor nations make for stability, or does it engender resentment and animosities? What is the basis of your answer?
8. Is it true that economic values have overbalanced other human values in determining the international policies of nations today? What is the evidence?
9. Would you expect the "next war," if there should be one, to come about as the result of economic competition between nations, or because of economic stress within certain nations, or for reasons primarily other than economic?

Chapter IV. Does racial tension threaten peace?

1. What are the main areas of racial tension in the world today? What races are involved?
2. What is the real meaning of terms such as, "the Yellow peril," "the Black problem," "the color problem," "white domination," "anti-Semitism," "Armenian atrocities," "the unspeakable Turk," "Asiatic immigration"? Are these scare phrases or descriptions of acute problems?
3. Does the World War seem to have lessened or deepened racial consciousness and hatreds? In what ways? In what measure were the darker races drawn into the war?
4. Did the World War add to or lessen the racial prestige of the white race? Why and in what ways? What bearing has this on race friction?
5. Is racial friction a growing or a decreasing menace to world peace? Why?
6. Of the major examples of racial consciousness, the Slavic, the Anglo-Saxon, the Latin and the Mongolian, which do you regard as most likely to develop as a menace to international peace? Just what kind of racial aggressiveness would seem to you to be a menace to the world at this time?
7. Where and in what ways can the ordinary citizen help to lessen racial friction?

Chapter V. Is religion an international irritant or otherwise?

1. Some feel that religion, with its divisions into the great religions, and its sects within each religion, tends to intensify rather than to assuage political and racial differences and of itself adds a new source of cleavage and tension. What do you think?
2. Are there areas in the world where religious differences, or irritations growing out of these, are now creating international strain? Where and what are the sources of tension?
3. Has confidence in the power of religion to influence international life increased or diminished as a result of the war?
4. The majority of the Christian churches in all countries served during the war to intensify the war spirit and to reinforce government action. Is this the proper function of the Church at such a time?
5. What has been the effect of the war and its aftermath on organized Christianity as a force making for friendly relations between nations?
6. Has any existing confidence that the so-called Christian nations were trying to work towards a Christian ethic in international affairs been developed or undermined by the war and its aftermath? What evidence, if any, that they are working to this end?

Chapter VI. Is the international situation as a whole so critical that it demands special attention on the part of those not connected with the government?

1. Which kinds of international strain seem to you to be the more acute, and which seem to be most strongly divisive in their trend: religious, economic, political or racial issues?
2. Is H. G. Wells right when he says that it is a race between catastrophe and education? Are others right when they say that we must think or perish?

3. As compared with 1913, is the situation now more or less critical than then?
4. Is the *opinion* of persons not in responsible positions of government of sufficient importance to justify their trying to form a judgment on these issues? In what ways is it important? In what regards do you question its importance?
5. What *activities* of an internationally cooperative sort can ordinary people promote?
6. What is the responsibility of students in this regard? Has this responsibility increased since 1913? If so, why?

PART III—CERTAIN MORAL ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Chapter VII. Should a state¹ seek its own material advantage first and foremost?

1. It is claimed that the general practice is for nations to promote their own economic welfare even at the expense of the material welfare of other nations. What illustrations are there where nations have subordinated their own economic interests for the sake of the welfare of other nations? What instances where the opposite has been the case?
 - (a) Would you say that these examples have made for international progress or not? Why?
 - (b) Could or could not these examples be fairly interpreted as being really instances of long-sighted national self-interest?
2. By what methods do nations look out for their own material welfare as against the economic interests of other nations? Are such defensive and aggressive methods justifiable? Why, or why not?
3. Should a nation disregard its own material interests or keep them in abeyance for the sake of other nations? Is the promotion of national self-interest the best way to secure international welfare?
4. Are government office-holders trustees for the people who elect them? In what measure can such officials, out of the pockets of their own people, be generous to foreign nations?
5. Are world economic interests the same as the sum of the economic interests of individual nations? If so, why do you think so? If not, where does the difference lie?

¹The words "nation" and "state" are used interchangeably without raising the question of the difference really inherent in these two terms.

6. What hope, if any, would one single nation have of putting an international economic ideal into practice without disaster to itself?

Chapter VIII. What degree of internationalism is consistent with an intelligent nationalism?

1. What are the ordinary evidences and manifestations of national pride? How, if at all, does it differ from patriotism?
2. Which of the following are causes of national pride:—
 - (a) Real and unmistakable values in the nation as it is today?
 - (b) A knowledge of what one's nation has already achieved or an assurance of its ultimate destiny?
 - (c) A leave-over of the tribal spirit of prehistoric days?
 - (d) A meagre knowledge of the praiseworthy qualities of other nations and cultures?
 - (e) Propaganda, such as one-sided presentation of national history in text-books, newspapers and magazines?
3. What elements in national pride are helpful from an international point of view?
4. What aspects of national pride tend to create international friction?
 - (a) Just what effect does an attitude of boastfulness, a "certain spirit of condescension" on the part of travelers, have on the nationals of countries visited?
 - (b) Just what effect on international relations comes from a spirit of complacent self-sufficiency on the part of nationals of any country as evidenced in laws, commercial practices or other expressions of normal life which have international outreach?
 - (c) What attitudes and actions originating in other nations tend to cause a quick feeling of resentment on the part of yourself and your acquaintances? Why? Would similar occasions for resentment probably arise in other countries if the tables were turned?

5. Is the cultivation of national pride and patriotic feeling a worthy objective of citizenship?
6. If the reply to (5) is in the affirmative, just what methods of so doing are consonant with a worthy nationalism? With a worthy internationalism? As the world is at present organized is there any basis for patriotism other than the progress of one's nation towards its own highest development? When does patriotism become jingoism?
7. Should national pride preclude or stimulate criticism of national policies by citizens of the nation concerned? Just what is the function and what are the limits of criticism in national life? Just where or under what circumstances does criticism of one's own nation and its policies become a matter which bears on international relationships?
8. What is the relation between national pride and national honor?
 - (a) Could national pride be set aside and national honor remain? Why? Why not?
 - (b) Could national honor be lost and national pride remain? Why? Why not?
 - (c) Can national honor be safely trusted to an international tribunal, such as a board of arbitration or world court? Why? Why not?
 - (d) In what measure, if any, does national pride tend to hide behind national honor for justification of its positions?
 - (e) Does a true internationalism require the sacrifice of both national pride and national honor, or of either? If so, why? If not, why not?
9. What is the relation between a worthy nationalism and a worthy internationalism? What is nationalism? What is a nation? What could be the nature of nationalistic feeling on the part of a citizen of a nation if that nation were part of a world order in which each nation of the earth had a worthy and equitable share? Is it possible to be consistently internationally minded and still have a deep nationalistic feeling?

Chapter IX. Under what circumstances is a state justified in resisting external acts of aggression?

1. What are ordinarily considered acts of aggression?
 - (a) Which of these are a real challenge to sovereignty? Which threaten economic welfare and efficiency? Which tend primarily to wound national pride?
 - (b) Which, if any, justify some sort of defense action on the part of a nation? Why?
 - (c) When do individuals or private corporations, whose interests suffer at the hands of an outside nation or of its citizens, become entitled to government protection? Is an act of aggression against an American citizen or corporation an act of aggression against the United States? Why? Why not?
2. In case of an unmistakable act of aggression which of the following are practicable and desirable measures? Name any others that might be considered.
 - (a) Defense by arms, by economic boycott or by other means.
 - (b) Reference to the League of Nations.
 - (c) Appeal to an international court.
 - (d) Deliberate non-resistance.
3. Would it make any difference in your answer if there were involved:
 - (a) Only your own material interest?
 - (b) The material interests of your fellow-citizens?
 - (c) The material interests of an innocent outside nation?
 - (d) The lives of people of an innocent outside nation?
 - (e) Your own life and the lives of others near to you?
4. Of the measures listed above as possibly practicable and desirable, which would be most likely to appeal to the nation suffering under some aggressive act on the part of another nation?

Which would be most likely to decrease the probability of renewed aggression on the part of the offending nation?

Which would be likely to be protectively efficient with relation to other possible aggressors in the future?

Which would contribute most to a developing internationalism?

Are there other considerations which need to be weighed in this connection?

Chapter X. Are punishment and retaliation legitimate as expressions of international judgments?

1. What is punishment?

(a) Does it naturally and necessarily follow as the effect of any international wrong, or are the laws of cause and effect unable to restrain a "wicked" nation from further encroachments upon the rights of society?

(b) Can there be punishment without retaliation? Can there be retaliation without punishment?

(c) Can "punishment" be administered by any agency unless this agency is charged with the maintenance of a code of conduct? Can one nation "punish" another without thereby claiming the rôle of custodian of its morals?

2. Is either retaliation or punishment fair or expedient in international affairs?

(a) Can the proportion of guilt between two contending nations be established clearly enough to fix moral blame?

(b) Suppose an overt act of aggression on the part of a nation were decided upon by a few leaders in power or by a bare majority of the electorate, should the nation as a whole be made to suffer for the offenses of a part only of the nation?

(c) Is it true that the sins of the fathers are visited upon the children? Should we see to it that this comes to pass? In how far should the children of Germany, born during or after the war, be made to suffer for Germany's guilt? Should the children of Germany be relieved of suffering at the cost of the children of France? Why? Why not?

- (d) Did the post-war commercial blockade of Germany make international adjustments easier or more difficult? Why?
 - (e) Suppose a nation refuses to acknowledge guilt ascribed to it by the majority of nations, will peace and amity in the world be promoted by seeking to force a confession of guilt?
 - (f) Is the right to punish a necessary part of any system of laws? Would it, for instance, be a necessary accompaniment of a world court? In that case, who would punish a given international offender? What is the relation between the enforcement of law and the punishment of those who break it?
 - (g) Could punishment of offenders be justified in cases of backward nations which care little for international disapproval? Why? Why not?
 - (h) Which is more important, to impose suffering for past crimes, or to remove the power to commit fresh crimes against international peace? If the latter, how should this be accomplished?
3. Is the new world order to be built on the placing of guilt for and punishment of the sins of the old era, or is there some method yet untried which could replace punishment?
- (a) How is the entail of hatred which descends from one generation to another in Europe to be broken? (Napoleonic wars, Franco-German war of 1870, World War, etc.) Can world peace be established without somehow breaking that entail?
 - (b) What treatment of the youth of the central nations of Europe will be most productive of an international cooperative spirit on their part two decades hence?

PART IV—INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND WORLD PROGRESS

Chapter XI. What sort of organization will insure nations living together in amity as do the people within a nation?

1. What are the factors making for peace within a nation? Which of these are essential if international order is to be maintained? What additional factors, if any, are necessary? Are the same forces for strife existent inside the state as outside? If so, why do they not produce war?
2. How have people within a nation learned to live in law and order? By what methods and through what processes has the present fabric of national life been developed?
3. At what stage in this development are we in international affairs? What are the next steps necessary to the development of a worthy international life?
4. Is there any prospect of establishing the reign of law among nations? What is the reign of law? How would it affect the sovereignty of states? What does it involve? Is a constitution, a legislature, a judiciary and a police force necessary to the maintenance of the reign of law? Will diplomacy continue to be a major method in world affairs?
5. It is claimed that a worthy world order will never come to pass until a public opinion within nations is developed which will believe in the subordination of national interests, to international welfare. Is this a primary prerequisite? How may such public opinion be formed? Do international law and the present practice of diplomacy represent what the people want?

6. To what extent will force be necessary in the developing world order? What would you say of Admiral Mahan's statement that the function of force is to give moral ideas time to take root? Is this the true function of force? Is the use of force necessary? Does a nation have to defend itself? Does civilization have to use force to resist barbarous reaction or to secure conditions of progress, or to maintain peace?
7. Just what kind of governmental institutions does the world need? Would a league of nations and a world court help? Would the proposal to outlaw war be likely to lead toward the establishment of a reign of law among nations? Why? Why not?
8. In a developing world order what duty, if any, do the most civilized nations owe to their backward neighbors?
 - (a) Can the backward peoples maintain themselves under modern conditions of world life, industrial competition and economic penetration? If not, what duty devolves on the more advanced nations to protect the backward peoples and to train them to govern themselves under modern competitive conditions?
 - (b) If such supervision is necessary should it be exercised by individual nations or through some international agency? Would you prefer to see the existing colonies administered as at present or transferred to the control of some kind of international agency? What are the chief dangers in control by a single nation? What are the dangers in control by an international agency? What do you think of the mandate provision of the Covenant of the League of Nations?
 - (c) Broadly speaking, would you distinguish between the colonies in Asia and those in Africa and the Pacific Islands in this connection? If so, how and why?
 - (d) Does modern capitalism with its international outreach simplify or make more complex the problem of protection of the backward peoples? In what ways?
 - (e) What kind of an international agency for the protection of the less advanced peoples would you like to see developed? What measure of democracy for the peo-

ples protected should be provided? Would the peoples enjoying the protection of such a structure of government provided from without be more free or less free than they would be without such international control? Why?

- (f) Should all of the more advanced nations share in the responsibilities involved in the supervision of backward nations? Why or why not? Which of the more advanced nations are best equipped by international experience, economic status or moral idealism for such participation? What would be the effect of leaving the responsibility for the backward peoples entirely to the less advanced nations?

PART V—CHRISTIANITY AND THE SOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS

Chapter XII. Shall we look to Christianity for the solution of international problems?

1. Many feel that after 2000 years of Christianity the World War is a proof of its inability to meet the situation. Did the World War represent the failure of Christianity as a solvent of international problems?

One man says "Christianity has not been tried and found wanting; it has been found difficult and not tried." Another contends, in reply, that through all the Christian era a multitude of faithful souls have struggled, even unto death, to bring Christianity to bear upon all life. What is the trouble, that Christianity has not been tried? Have even avowed Christians misunderstood Christianity or has there been available truth and power which Christians have failed to appropriate? Would more Christianity of the kind known to you help the situation?

2. Does Christianity's contribution in the past justify confidence that it will offer the way out? What contribution, if any, has Christianity made toward the solution of international problems?¹

(a) Many Christians have for years worked on international questions. The present world situation would suggest that their efforts have been fairly ineffective. In the face of this record, is it fantastic to try to influence the conduct of international affairs through the further extension of the spirit and teachings of Christianity?

(b) Some say that Christianity, instead of helping, has been a hindrance to progress, as in the days of the Inquisi-

¹A special questionnaire suitable for careful students of history is to be prepared covering this question; it will later be made available to study groups.

tion. To what extent is this a fair statement? Give other examples.

(c) It is claimed, in other cases, that Christianity has been of positive help in the betterment of international relations, as in the overthrow of slavery and in the apparently more humane treatment of backward races. To what extent is this a fair statement? Give other examples.

(d) Have those advances in the progress of civilization which we can trace, at least in part, to the influence of Christianity come of an increasingly intelligent interpretation of Christianity? Have such advances come rather from the widening influence of Christianity? What contribution toward a better understanding between peoples has been made by the missionary enterprise?

(e) What progress has been made toward understanding the application of the spirit and teachings of Jesus to international affairs?

3. What do we mean by the phrase "solution" in the chapter heading above?

4. How shall we think of Christianity in this connection?

(a) As some particular church with its accepted standard of faith and practice?

(b) As a group of organized churches of varying and even opposing doctrines, politics and programs?

(c) As the teaching of an authoritative book?

(d) As a divine revelation from God contained in that book?

(e) As the present-day expression in the world of an historical religious movement and process?

(f) As the projection into history of the life and purpose of God through the person of Jesus?

(g) As one of the great religions of the world with Jesus as its founder and chief inspiration?

(h) As a way of life patterned after the life and teachings of Jesus?

(i) As God's plan for human relations, set forth by Jesus in terms of the family spirit, and expressed in the pro-

gressive realization of responsible government (national and international) on a steadily increasing democratic basis?⁴

5. Have the methods of propagating Christianity been wrong, futile or misleading?
 - (a) Just what methods of commending Christianity to the unconvinced or to the uninterested in your college or community do you believe would be truly effective?
 - (b) Would these same methods be appropriate for use in the so-called non-Christian lands?
6. If the energies which seem inherent in the Christian position are not being realized where does the fault lie? Is it lack of education? Is it lack of organization? Is it lack of coordination of some kind?
 - (a) Has Christianity already developed latent goodwill in the world that is going to waste, or that, at least, is failing to find expression?
 - (b) In the post-war period of disillusionment and sceptical cynicism about world affairs, how have those of your acquaintance expressed themselves about Christianity as a possible way out?
7. If a proposed Christian solution does not seem to you possible to achieve at the present time, why is this the case?
 - (a) Is it because there is general rejection of the methods which might have to be used in bringing about a Christian world order?
 - (b) Is it because the picture of a world at peace is not generally attractive?
 - (c) Is it because Christianity, however inspiring as a personal ideal, does not seem to you to be a social force?
8. How would you describe a truly Christian solution to the problem of international relationships? To what kind of an international order would the Christian way of life lead?

⁴Another wording of this question follows: Is Christianity a belief about God? a theory about Jesus? a body of ethics? a system of doctrines? a system of laws? an institution? a creed or creeds? a way of living? an experience of God breaking into human life?

- (a) Would it imply a new spirit in the relationships of nations as they now stand? Or would it mean some rather new kind of world order?
- (b) Are proposals that there be a body of international law and a system for enforcing it in keeping with your understanding of a Christian way of life? From the point of view of a follower of Jesus could such a proposal be considered a solution?
- (c) Is the Christian way of life a fixed and absolute standard? Might it involve progressive standards of judgments by which our international relationships would be governed?
 - (1) If the former, how can we know what the Christian way of life is? And, once knowing it, how shall we apply it as our way in the changing world?
 - (2) If the latter [i.e., second half of 8 (c)], what will determine the advance in standards as to what the Christian way of life involves? And how shall a person be sure that he is "following" this way?
- (d) How can the dynamic underlying the Christian way of life be brought to bear effectively on the causes leading to international conflict?
- (e) How can such international good will as is already in existence be focussed and brought to effective public expression?

Chapter XIII. Does Jesus' way of dealing with the problems of life offer help in solving the problems arising in international relations?

1. One of the persistent questions of the day seems to be whether in Jesus will be found the solution of the international question. How do you account for this? What bearing has his life, lived two thousand years ago in a small Near-Eastern district, upon the international problems of today?
2. Were there international relationships, in our sense, in his day? What international problems, if any, were within the range of his experience?

3. Would it, or would it not, be more profitable to study the life and teachings of some modern, high-minded international statesman?
4. When a so-called "international problem" is resolved down to its essential elements, in what respects and to what degree does it differ in its essential issues from an individual, a community, a state or a national problem? Is the difference in kind or in degree? In what ways, if any, are the life principles bearing on relations between individuals different from those bearing on relations between groups?
5. What were some of the great issues with which Jesus dealt? Which of these are major issues in the international problem? Does the parable of the "Good Samaritan," for instance, seem to you to be a parable of individual relationships or does the principle involved have social and even international bearings as well? Why?
6. Is it the spirit of Jesus, his teachings, his aims, his methods or his achievements that should most concern us?
 - (a) In what measure are Christians as you know them really seeking to understand the life and teachings of Jesus with reference to the bearing of these on their own personal problems and outlook on life? What means are they using to this end?
 - (b) How would you proceed in a personal inquiry to discover this bearing for your own life?
7. What is his true significance for us in connection with the problems of achieving right world relationships?
8. Is the failure to realize the significance of Jesus in international affairs because He has significance only for individual life or because we have not studied this significance from the international viewpoint? Is the trouble with our knowledge and understanding of the truth or with our determination to put it into practice?
9. Do the number and variety of interpretations of Jesus' teachings suggest a failure up till now fully to comprehend these teachings, or are they so rich in meaning that various minds find varied meanings in this or that teaching?

10. How would you proceed in an inquiry to discover the bearing of Jesus' life and teachings on the whole world situation or on the solution of particular international problems?
11. If the implications of Jesus' teachings with reference to the moot difficulties in international problems were plain to you, how would you proceed to bring the teachings to bear on these problems: how would you make this truth "gear into life"?
12. Could one nation put the Christian way of life into effect in its international relations while other nations concerned were acting on lower motives and ideals?
13. Jesus staked his life on his principles and lost it: He commended his principles to his followers; does international progress now require an acceptance of these principles by nations as well as by individuals? Must some one nation be willing to risk its life if a Christian world is to be achieved?
14. Just what measure and kind of acceptance of the religion of Jesus would you desire to see throughout the world as a basis of that unity of spiritual life which would seem to be essential for a world order of a spiritual kind?
15. From the point of view of the contribution of Jesus' life and teachings to the development of better international relations, just what place ought missionary effort to have in the Christian program?

PART VI—ESTABLISHING A CHRISTIAN WORLD ORDER

Chapter XIV. With what confidence may we strive for the establishment of a Christian world order?

1. Could the usual means of securing national purposes and ambitions be employed in a Christian world order? Would they prevail?
 - (a) Which of the following methods could those interested in the Christian way of life use? Which others would you add?
 - (1) Legislation.
 - (2) Education.
 - (3) Military coercion and police coercion.
 - (4) Economic coercion.
 - (5) Social custom (approval and disapproval).
 - (6) International relief projects.
 - (7) Propaganda literature and movements.
 - (8) Political organization, national and international.
 - (9) Courts of international justice.
 - (b) Would a Christian majority be justified in forcing the Christian way of life upon an unwilling minority?
 - (c) Could a Christian world order be established internationally without coercion?
 - (d) Should effort first be made to change the spirits of men, trusting that there would follow the creation of adequate machinery both for bringing in and maintaining a Christian world order, or is organization so essential to progress that it must develop, step by step, with pur-

pose, sentiment and convictions with reference to a worthy international society?

- (e) What is the place of missions in the whole process of developing a Christian world order?
- 2. Human nature being what it is, what hope is there of achieving a Christian world?
 - (a) It has come to be assumed that un-Christian conditions in the world are inevitable because of human nature. Human nature being what it is, there is no hope. Is human nature what it is because of unchangeable tendencies found in people or are its bad qualities habits which have been learned? What are the arguments given to support this? What do the psychologists say? Could good habits have been as easily learned?
 - (b) What basis is there in the native tendencies of men and women for the development of Christian international habits of living?
 - (c) Jesus seemed to feel that his principles are the only practicable principles for life and those which are most true to human nature. Was He all wrong? Partly wrong? Or have we misinterpreted Him?
 - (d) In other realms than the international, human nature has been sufficiently changed so that wholesale slaughter and disorder are not tolerated. Why are they tolerated in international affairs?
 - (e) Much of the Eastern world does not believe in war or practice it. Is this because of an inherent difference in original nature or because of a difference in training and social environment?
 - (f) If Christian virtues were as soundly approved socially as are the present, inherited virtues, would they be practiced?
 - (g) If Christians had refused to use warring methods in the propagation of Christianity would this have made any difference in Christian progress?
 - (h) What are the most practical means of changing the nature of the people of a nation?

- (i) What elements would there be in the life and attitude of a group if a world mind were to be the dominating experience? Understanding of and sympathy for other peoples? Readiness to sacrifice for other peoples? A fundamental change in the life and outlook of nations? New motives, new living impulses? A concerted thought and common will of the people of the world?
 - (j) It is maintained that the German government by a system of education changed the habits and attitudes of a nation within a single generation. How rapidly do you think the peoples of the world might be brought to think and work internationally? How rapidly might they be brought to purpose and desire together to achieve a Christian world order?
 - (k) Are there spiritual resources and powers now at work in humanity, or surely accessible to it, which seem to you to suffice for achieving a Christian world order through human agencies?
 - (l) If the Christian looks with confidence for the ultimate establishment of a Christian world order, what shall he do in the meantime about common practices which he may regard as un-Christian?
3. Given certain incentives, either individual or social, which we believe would be appropriate in a Christian world order, what is to be said as to the effectiveness of these incentives for *maintaining* such an order? Would they be strong enough to maintain the unity of society?
- (a) What are the incentives which, in your judgment, would be operative in a Christian world?
 - (b) Are unselfish motives as strong as selfish motives? Does a call to **meet the need** of another nation appeal as strongly as a summons to conquer another nation?
 - (c) Could the struggle for existence be directed into such channels as to make it Christian?
 - (d) What place has personal or group ambition in the Christian world?
 - (e) What of the principle of losing your life that you may save it? Is this a selfish or unselfish principle? Does it work? To what end?

- (f) How can you answer those who say that conflict is needed for the sake of human development? Would you agree that a devastating fire might be started in order to develop heroic qualities?
 - (g) Does the theory of "the survival of the fittest" find its place in the Christian way of life?
 - (h) What hope is there that such valuable and worthy qualities as are now found in the spirit of national patriotism can be preserved and a world spirit added thereto, as higher forms of international life and organization are developed?
4. Pending the achievement of a Christian world order, what shall the Christian do about common practices which he may regard as un-Christian? Has compromise a place in the Christian way of life?
 5. How would you distinguish, if at all, between a Christian world order and your conception of the Kingdom of God on earth?

CHAPTER I

SELECTED READINGS

The first thing and the indispensable thing to enable the people to control those large issues of foreign affairs which they are entitled to determine is that they should, obtaining more knowledge, give a more continuously active attention to the affairs of the outer world.—James Bryce, "International Relations," p. 188.

It is the commonplace of diplomats and statesmen, in their confidential intercourse, that they would like to do many things which are reasonable in themselves, in order to remove differences and to settle disputes, but that public opinion in their respective countries will not permit them to act in the way in which they would like to act. This, in all negotiations to adjust differences, is found to be the last refuge of unreasonableness.—Hon. Charles E. Hughes, address of May 17, 1923.

Many thoughtful men and women in Britain of various or no political attachment, but nourished upon liberal ideas and valuations, are convinced that the very existence of Western civilization is in jeopardy owing to the failure of Europe to make a good recovery from the material and moral injuries of the great war. Believing that the strongest cooperation of liberal-minded people in all countries is urgently required if this peril is to be averted, they would naturally turn in the first instance to the people of America, who have inherited so many of the same traditions and institutions as themselves.—Appeal to the American Liberals, signed by well-known British Liberals, including John Drinkwater, J. M. Keynes, Gilbert Murray, Maude Royden, Graham Wallas. *News Bulletin* of the Foreign Policy Association, Vol. II, No. 41.

Education in a democratic world . . . must be international and world wide in its outlook and in its interest. We have

been emphasizing the word democratic in our phrase "a democratic world." Let me emphasize for a moment the other element of the phrase. It is a democratic *world* toward which we are moving—a world in which all democracies will be mutually related, in which more and more they will have, and will be aware that they have, common interests.—Ernest De Witt Burton, "Education in a Democratic World," *University Record*, New Series, Vol. VIII, No. 4, October 1922, p. 205.

We are faced . . . with the hideous danger that fighting may blaze up again throughout the whole Eurasian continent, and that the young men and girls of Europe may have no more choice in the way they spend their time than they had from 1914 to 1918 or the serfs of Pharaoh had in ancient Egypt. But if that immediate danger is avoided, I dream that in Europe and in America a conscious and systematic discussion by the young thinkers of our time of the conditions of a good life by an unprivileged population may be one of the results of the new vision of human nature and human possibilities which modern science and modern industry have forced upon us.

Within each nation, industrial organization may cease to be a confused and wasteful struggle of interests, if it is consciously related to a chosen way of life for which it offers to every worker the material means. International relations may cease to consist of a constant plotting of evil by each nation for its neighbors, if ever the youth of all nations know that French, and British, and Germans, and Russians, and Chinese, and Americans are taking a conscious part in the great adventure of discovering ways of living open to all, and which all can believe to be good.—Graham Wallas, "Human Nature and Politics," pp. 10, 11. (Third Edition, 1921.)

CHAPTER II

SELECTED READINGS

We are thinking of no war for us, anywhere. But there was no cloud for us in 1914, and yet we were drawn into the very cataclysm of all wars.—President Harding's Memorial Day Address, *New York Times*, May 31, 1923.

The war and the so-called peace which has followed the war have left the Old World in a situation which Americans need to realize, since they also are affected by it. They cannot treat the economic and financial and political disasters which have befallen the great European countries as matters that can be regarded from a distance with calmness or with that complacency which the ancient poet attributes to the man who from the shore sees vessels laboring in the storm. You may rather feel, as another ancient poet observes, that nobody can be unconcerned when his neighbor's house is in a blaze. In the New World as well as in the Old, all men of good will are concerned to try to bring about a better peace by removing the dangers and injustices which bode future wars. It will tax all the wisdom and self-control of the Old World Powers to do this, and I doubt whether it can be done without the help of the New World.—James Bryce, "International Relations," pp. 72, 73.

Every group, class and nation that seeks to liberate itself talks only of its own rights, as if there were only individuals and no society. This one-sidedness, as expressed in the principle of self-determination, is responsible for much of our present misery. It was no accident that the doctrine of self-determination came to us in its present form from America. It is the doctrine of immigrants, who have carved out their fortunes in a land without a history. For Europe this doctrine is dynamite. It has blinded people to the necessity of sacrifice, compromise and conciliation. Self-determination alone is not enough: we must respect the same right in others.—Professor Friedrich W. Foerster, *Living Age*, August 25, 1923, p. 345.

Professor A. M. Low, scientist and inventor, whose work during the World War was highly valued by the British War Inventions Board, contributes a remarkable article to the *Fortnightly Review* on the sort of warfare that may be expected a hundred years hence. Among the things he expects to play a part in future warfare are:

Jets of water, charged with electricity, to kill horses and men. Wireless telephony, sight, heat, power and writing. Wireless control of tanks and airplanes. Battle plane engines developing wireless power to destroy aircraft within hundreds of yards. Wireless heat to destroy European regions. Giant transport air-

planes with incredible speed. Secret war plans ferreted out by wireless telephone and sight, the future war's eyes and ears. Propaganda striking terror into every home by means of wireless receivers which will be more common than any telephone today. Armoured boats, capable of diving under the water and of flying in the air, a kind of combined tank-submarine-airplane. Airplanes with electric impulse, their guns firing an enormous number of bullets a second. Electrically controlled rockets, operated on wires, for wrecking planes. A wireless controlled torpedo with wireless sighted periscope, controlled by a secret combination of wave lengths. Gyroscopic, wireless airplanes over which operator, who may also be in sight, has absolute control and can release bombs at will.—London Cable, *New York Times*, August 30, 1923.

Reparations, interallied debts, the markets of the world, are vanishing. Perhaps European civilization itself is going down in the wreckage. No victor in any proper sense can now emerge from the conflict. It is no longer a question of who shall come forth successful but of who shall survive. But the unmistakable gravity of the situation, the general perception of the universal catastrophe which threatens, supplies no solution, invites no accommodation.—Frank H. Simonds, *American Review of Reviews*, April, 1923, p. 379.

We must master the perils of interdependence or be mastered by them. Foreign policy is no longer a matter of party politics; it is a matter of life or death.—Glenn Frank, "The Wages of Complexity," *Century*, December, 1923, p. 320.

There must be some real ground for the universal unrest and perturbation. It is not to be found in superficial politics or in mere economic blunders. It probably lies deep at the sources of the spiritual life of our time.—Ex-President Woodrow Wilson, "The Road Away from Revolution," *Atlantic Monthly Press*, pp. 2, 3.

It seems as if the repulsive dictum of old Thomas Hobbes would have to be accepted as the verdict of history, that the sole basis of human actions is "a perpetual and restless desire of power after power: that ceases only in death." And it is only as a cover for this that the demand for liberty that means equality is so continuously put forward: what is sought in reality is the liberty that means domination. . . .

Since a nation was in the final analysis a people, and since a state was specifically a sovereign, the creed of the nineteenth century may be formulated concisely thus: All peoples are by nature free and equal. To the dogma of the Roman jurist in the third century and to that of the French jurist in the sixteenth, the political science of our own age has added the logical supplement. All *men* are by nature free and equal: all *states* are by nature free and equal: all *peoples* are by nature free and equal. . . .

The peoples that have become free have almost invariably forgotten that peoples are by nature also equal. The liberty achieved has proved to be the liberty that means domination, not that which means equality.—William A. Dunning, "Liberty and Equality in International Relations," *American Political Science Review*, February, 1923, pp. 9, 10, 14.

The experience of this week in Italy, following that of our stay in Paris, is for me a complete disproof of the notion that the common people in Europe even now dislike war or desire peace. With the memory of Caporetto still fresh, the backs of the workers bending under the ever-growing burden of war debts, and the savings of the middle classes divided in four thereby, the whole country is nevertheless aflame with war fever. If tomorrow this pinchbeck Napoleon should go on to the seizure not only of Fiume but of Salonica, Malta, Gibraltar, and Egypt, of which his press is already seriously talking, he would have the whole country behind him.—Extract of letter to Norman Angell from an American friend in Italy, *New Republic*, September 19, 1923.

I am far from implying that even worse things than war may not come to a state. There are circumstances in which nothing can so well become a country, as I think this land proved when the late war did break out and there was but one thing to do. There is a form of anaemia that is more rotting than even an unjust war. The end will indeed have come to our courage and to us when we are afraid in dire mischance to refer the final appeal to the arbitrament of arms. I suppose all the lusty of our race, alive and dead, join hands on that.

"And he is dead who will not fight;
And who dies fighting has increase."

—Sir J. M. Barrie, "Courage," 1922, p. 12.

CHAPTER III

SELECTED READINGS

In actual money, paid out over the counter, much of it taken from the world's accumulated wealth, the war cost one hundred and eighty-six billion dollars. If you add the indirect cost such as destruction of property, loss of production and the capitalized value of the human lives, the sum reaches three hundred and thirty-seven billion dollars. The national debts of Great Britain rose from three and a half billions to thirty-nine billions; of France from six and a third billions to forty-six billions; of the United States from one billion to nearly twenty-five billions.—Will Irwin, "The Next War," p. 83.

The war bled us terribly. Out of our population of less than 38,000,000 there were mobilized 8,500,000; 5,300,000 of them were killed or wounded (1,500,000 killed, 800,000 *mutiles*, 3,000,000 wounded), not counting 500,000 men who have come back to us from German prisons in very bad physical condition.

Almost 4,000,000 hectares of land were devastated, together with 4000 towns and villages; 600,000 buildings were destroyed, among them 20,000 factories and work-shops, besides 5000 kilometers of railroads and 53,000 kilometers of roads. About 1,400,000 head of cattle were carried off. Altogether, a quarter of our productive capital was annihilated.

The financial consequences of the annihilation of all these resources bear down on us heavily today. The war cost us 150 billions of francs. The damage to property and persons comes to 200 billions. Our ordinary budget has increased from four and one-half billions to 25 billions; our debt from 36 billions to 330 billions. Since the armistice we have spent on reconstruction and on pensions a total of 90 billions, and we have received from Germany in one form or another less than two billions of gold marks (about six billions of francs), or about six per cent of what we have had to spend on restoring our provinces—a task as yet but half completed.—Andre Tardieu, "The Policy of France," *Foreign Affairs*, September, 1922, pp. 12, 13.

If you look at the world as a whole today, and cast back your memories to the days immediately succeeding the Amistice and the days of 1919, and contrast what you see now with what you saw then, you will certainly see a very great improvement in the general temper of the world. It is true that there are still one or two dark spots . . . but taking the situation as a whole, . . . there has been a great move forward toward economic recovery. . . . It is foolish to hope that the world will in any short space of time . . . reach what must be its new basis of economic stability—because the old basis is destroyed forever.—Sir Auckland Geddes, in "Internationalism—a hope for the future," quoted in *Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science*, July, 1923, p. 215.

To suggest the possibility of great nations going to war over oil is to suggest that civilization shall plunge to its downfall in the struggle to control the very natural resources which are intended to aid and promote the progress of mankind. To suggest that great nations and great aggregations of capital should engage in cut-throat commercial competition over one of nature's bounties which ought to be carefully conserved, economically marketed and intelligently used, is to suggest that the gratification of national and corporate avarice is liable to become more dominant over the policies of the nations and their citizens than conceptions of intelligent cooperation to foster the progress of civilization.—A. C. Bedford, "The World Oil Situation," *Foreign Affairs*, March, 1923, p. 96.

It has been customary to regard commerce as the peace dynamic among men. Certainly commerce demands peace for the development of trade. But commerce always produces war for the expansion of trade. Where trade expands, nations are brought into conflict. The expansion of trade is but the development of commerce from the limits of national to international area. Even individual traders crush each other in the press of competition, so that nations, which possess fewer ethics than individuals, can scarcely avoid conflict. But the fallacy that commerce necessitates peace is hard to remove.—A. J. MacDonald, "Trade, Politics and Christianity in Africa," p. 3.

A powerful guarantee for peace is provided by international trade, so that the larger is the volume that trade attains, and the more numerous are the persons directly engaged in it, or whose welfare it affects, so much the less likely are states to seek in war a solution of their controversies. Many thinkers and statesmen have regarded this as the influence which would ultimately put an end to war by making every nation feel the losses to both the contending parties which war cannot but involve.—James Bryce, "International Relations," p. 80.

One of the advertised features of the aerial carnival held recently near New York City, with the cooperation of the air-services of the army and the navy, was the destruction by bombing-planes of a town constructed for the occasion and "supposed to be inhabited by 3000 persons." Inasmuch as the so-called laws of war, as recently revised, have put the bombing of non-military places on the prohibited list, the performance at the aviation field on Long Island is in questionable taste; but perhaps our airmen are only fooling, and would not bomb a town except in fun. If we put the story in that form, it will make better reading for the little brown brothers of Latin America who have borrowed money from us, and who may have to be bombarded into a sound financial condition at any time. The project recently announced at Washington, of surveying an air-line from the Canal Zone across the Central American States, is one more intimation of the fact that the ends of dollar-diplomacy may now be very easily and economically arrived at.—*The Freeman*, November 21, 1923, p. 243.

It must be equally clear, however, that a solution is impossible without Germany, and without Germany's voluntary cooperation in carrying out that solution. Love or hate one another, we are interallied by fate, and any methods not supported by the will of the German people will yield no results, either for Germany or any French administration. . . . Economic boundaries do not coincide with political boundaries; economic Europe embraces the Allies and us together. One sick member doomed to economic death would infect all the others: disease would eat through the whole body of economic Europe.—Chancellor Stresemann, before the National Association of German Chambers of Commerce, *New York Times*, August 27, 1923.

In the modern world a nation is not confined to its own political borders. The American mining engineer developing a lode for the Ameer of Afghanistan is a part of America, just like the mining engineer driving a tunnel in Colorado. . . . If we are to have the perfect defence, we must prepare to back up American citizens and "American interests" in India as well as in Indiana, in New Guinea as well as in New York. It is hard, it is almost impossible, to draw the line; so we are pulled insensibly into the old, vicious circle.—Will Irwin, "The Next War," pp. 130, 131.

CHAPTER IV

SELECTED READINGS

Immunity from "color" does not . . . carry with it immunity from the color problem. We are vitally concerned . . . because the future of the Western civilization to which we belong is itself bound up with the problem. It will remain when troubles that absorb our attention today have passed away. Some see in it the potential cause of another world conflagration.—Editor's Preface, *The Round Table*, December, 1922, p. 45.

Britain's Negro problem is limited almost entirely to the African continent. The territorial responsibility in the whole continent covers about 3,500,000 square miles, equal to the United States of America, including Alaska and Hawaii. Within that area, 40,000,000 Negroes present hundreds of problems, of ever-increasing complexity. It is true that, up to the present time, Great Britain has been spared the odium of racial riots and lynchings; but racial antagonisms are, in some respects, more violent in character, and, in certain areas, are more deep-seated, and the economic effect more widely distributed, than in the American continent.

But easily the most striking fact is that within the British-African territories can be found the most antagonistic policies, with the most diverse results. In one territory, white men own all the land, and the natives none at all; in another ter-

ritory, the natives own all the land, and the whites can only with difficulty obtain terminable leases; in yet another territory, the natives have the franchise, while, in the adjoining territory, under the same government, they are denied the vote; in one territory well-to-do Negroes rejoice in luxurious motor-cars, and travel where they will, while in another region, the Negro may not walk along the footpath; in one area, there are "Jim Crow" cars; in another, most Negroes ride first-class on the railways. To the student of British Negro problems there seems little hope of avoiding a great upheaval, with disastrous consequences to Negro and white alike.—John H. Harris, *Atlantic Monthly*, April, 1923, p. 544.

It is nearly impossible to get at the right perspective of the Kenya affair. At bottom it is a mere point in the vast secular conflict of Europe with the rest of the world, of the white races against the colored. . . . The hard reality is the same, whether in the matter of the American citizenship for Indian or Japanese, or in Fiji, in South Africa or in the problem of the Philippines, or in the Khilafat. . . . The genuine throwing open of equal opportunities to Europeans and Indians in the Highlands [of Kenya] is an impossibility. It is beyond the power of assembly and deputation, beyond the power of governments and cabinets. Behind Lord Delamere and General Smuts is the white man's racial instinct for power and survival which sweeps irresistibly on, and there is no force on earth which can stand up against it. . . . The readiness to shock Europe into conviction of sin by the gigantic magnitude of our sacrifice; discipline, efficiency, courage and the faith that removes mountains—these are the primary needs. The meaning of Kenya is a challenge; the challenge to make ourselves free.—Editorial in *Young India* (Gandhi's organ). July 26, 1923.

The Christian churches in Africa and America that shut their doors against Asiatics and Africans still claim to be Christian, though they have most successfully managed to shut out the Asiatic Christ. In other words, there is a kind of Christianity that can exist without Christ in spite of Christian theologians. . . . In short, the New Jerusalem has descended from heaven not indeed like a bride adorned for the bridegroom but like a soldier with his modern rifle, hand grenade,

poison gas and poison mask.—Editorial in the *Indian Christian Patriot*, Madras, July 14, 1923.

To the present writer it seems that the danger to the white races will come from the yellows and the browns, not from the blacks or the reds, and that this danger is not at present of a military character. No doubt it may become a military danger in the future, if the white persist in excluding the yellow and the brown races by violence from the half-empty territories in which they desire to settle. If the white man is determined to throw his sword into the scales of peaceful competition, his rivals will be compelled at last to vindicate their rights by war. But at present the brown man will not take up arms except to obtain self-government for himself in his home, and this he is likely to obtain from Great Britain without fighting. The Japanese, in spite of a few fanatical expansionists, have no wish to try conclusions with Europe or America on the field of battle, so long as they are allowed to extend their influence on the continent of Asia. A mass-levy of Chinese for aggressive war is not to be thought of; they have none of the habits of Mongolian raiders, and, unlike the Japanese, they do not wish to be soldiers. The yellow peril, so far as it exists, is the peril of economic competition. . . .

The chief danger to the white man arises from his arrogant contempt for other races, a contempt which in some lands is mixed with fear and hatred, and which has provoked fear and hatred in return. Europeans have recently enjoyed an unfair advantage over their rivals, which they have abused without the slightest regard for justice and fair play. This advantage will not be theirs in the future: they will have to compete on equal terms with nations schooled by adversity and winnowed by the hard struggle for existence.—Dean Inge, from "Outspoken Essays," pp. 218, 230.

This [Syria and Palestine] is not like any other country in the world. What happens there matters. This is the most sensitive political nerve center. If things go wrong there the whole world is soon irritated. That is the situation this minute. Four years ago the East, and especially the Moslem part of it, was in a most reasonable spirit, really longed to be reconciled to the Western world, and had been much touched by and profoundly believed in the principles of the Fourteen Points as a

basis for this reconciliation. But on account of the complete failure of the Allies to live up to the promises made, or to take into account in the slightest degree the wishes of these people, and their suppression in the most brutal manner of any manifestation for freedom or independence, a deep wave of bitter anti-Western feeling has spread all over the East.—Charles R. Crane, *Our World*, August, 1922, pp. 5-6, 8.

CHAPTER V

SELECTED READINGS

Nowadays religion seems to be ruled by social movements, instead of guiding, commanding and inspiring them. All the world over, religious institutions apparently are struggling to adjust themselves to social forces—to people's temperaments. There still are state churches: there are orders and groups eager to serve society through employment bureaus and swimming pools; there are theologies of the social gospel eager to settle down with the mass on the level where they stand rather than on a higher plane of holiness. But where is religion itself? Where is shown the power of faith, of humility and of repentance? Science is said to have its sphere of interests independent of religion; not so religion, which is eager to accommodate itself to science. Religion is supposed to have a divine mission, but that mission is not seldom controlled by industrial magnates. There is something religious in the creeds and in the zeal of the social reformers, including socialists and bolsheviks, but many of them are mortal opponents of religion, at least in its organized form. One must ask, instead of "where," "what" is religion?

Many people in the West believe that the World War has brought to light the failure of Christianity, while some in the Orient join them in the cry of its impotence. Whether this be right or wrong, it is certain that the Christian religion or the churches were not potent enough either to create the war or to stop it. If Christianity did create it, it was the religion of the German Kaiser who had sent his troops to China in order to chastise the Chinese so thoroughly that they would not dare to stand face to face with Germans for the

coming thousand years. Orientals have read some of the sermons and prayers uttered in Christendom during the war, and find that the combination of Hurrah and Hallelujah is not limited to Germany. Naturally the questions arise in their minds: What is Christianity? Are the Occidental peoples really Christians?

All this I say not in the sense of passing my personal judgment upon Christianity and the Occidental nations, but in order to point out what is being questioned or thought, even by the average man in the East.

But turning to the religions of the Orient and questioning ourselves, we are compelled to confess that the same kind of doubts and questions face the Oriental religions. The Hindu is proud of his profound spiritual inheritance, but can he declare that his precious heritage alone is sufficient to organize his life? China tried to establish Confucianism as her state religion, but its failure is too obvious. Japan has her Shinto and Buddhism, but is not the mind of the rising generation being steadily alienated from these religions? Japanese Buddhism has its grand organizations active in education, in propaganda and in social work; but is it firmly confident that it possesses the spiritual vitality to inspire and lead the nation, not to speak of projecting foreign missions?

Okakura, in his "The Ideals of the East," said: "Asia is one"—i. e., one in her spiritual ideals. But that is true no more. Asia is divided in religion and in many other things, and if there is any oneness or likeness in the peoples of Asia, it is due to their contact with Occidental civilization, and that oneness consists in the common loss of equilibrium brought about by the new system of industry, science and democracy, as has been explained. This newer oneness means that the old religions have lost their position of dominance and are being controlled or disturbed by the social changes that are taking place. Hinduism, hopelessly interwoven with the caste system, is pre-eminently a conservative institutional force, and not an inspiring or regenerating power. Confucianism is a humanitarian ethics, but being an elaboration of a patriarchal system of politics and morals, its teachings are peculiarly static and formal. Shinto, being a remnant of ancient nature worship and of the cult of the spirits, cannot hope to withstand the pressure of science, while its communal ethics is struggling for life in the face of the industrial regime. One religion that remains

in the field with some hope is Buddhism. But it is hopelessly divided, its organizations are parochial, and its tenets often too metaphysical.

Asia, the cradle of all great religions, has still her religions and systems of ethics; but they are at a loss how to take hold of the world situation, how to accommodate themselves to the new regime. Then how can one look to these religions to lead the people and succeed in reviving their spiritual life, or in reconstructing their social life? The nations of Asia are passing through turmoil and fermentation, and the immediate issues are largely political and social. India is yearning for freedom; Siam is groaning under encroachments; China is engaged in a fierce struggle against foreign aggression and internecine strife; Japan is near the breaking point on the question of over-population and insufficient resources, and her people are engaged in a stubborn fight for greater democracy. The social problem of the Orient is essentially the outcome of the introduction of Occidental civilization, particularly its industrial regime. The strife of capital and labor is advancing with great strides. The congestion of the cities, the increase of excitement and temptation, the rise of insanity and criminality, these and other troubles keep pace with the organization of measures and forces to counteract them. In all these matters, the Orient is no more a realm secluded from the West, but here too the pressure of the gigantic rolling tank called civilization is equally felt.—Masaharu Anesaki, Tokyo Imperial University, "The Religious and Social Problems of the Orient," pp. 52-55.

For nearly thirteen centuries Christian Europe and the Moslem world have faced one another, like hostile powers, mutually aggressive and distrustful, and there have been few periods during which they have not been in open conflict in some part of the long frontier between their respective territories. . . .

One of the most striking features of the Mohammedan world, which has been emphasized by many observers, historians, travellers, and missionaries, is the feeling of unity in Islam which overleaps all the barriers set up by nationality or by geographical position. Islam has succeeded in obliterating race prejudice to an extent to which no other religious system in the world offers any parallel, and though, like other forms of the ideal of human brotherhood, Islam has failed to realize its ideal of the

brotherhood of all believers, still the measure of its success is the more noteworthy feature. It would be easy to give historical examples throughout the whole period of the thirteen centuries of the Mohammedan era. The ready welcome a convert receives into Moslem society, whatever may have been his previous nationality or social status, has impressed many Christian missionaries in various parts of the Mohammedan world. To the politician this characteristic of unity in the bonds of faith is a source of constant anxiety, as it is capable of expressing itself in forms of fanaticism that may spread rapidly over immense tracts of country and may link together in a common activity peoples otherwise sundered by whole continents or oceans. In the present day when intercommunication is so much easier, and the sufferings of the Moslem world have done so much to excite sympathy for fellow Moslems in distress, the possibility of a widespread activity becomes still more possible.—Sir T. W. Arnold, "Europe and Islam" in "Western Races and the World," pp. 146, 151, 152.

A dispute over the control of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre was the immediate cause of the Crimean War of 1854. But that contest solved nothing, and the struggle for religious supremacy in Palestine continued down until the outbreak of the World War. And it was always more than a religious struggle, itself marred by incessant and un-Christian brawls. It was also political. Behind the Orthodox Church has loomed Pan-Slavism; behind Roman Catholicism has loomed Rome; behind Protestantism has loomed Germany, as the visit of the Kaiser to the Holy Land in 1898 proved.—Raymond Leslie Buell, *Current History*, September, 1922, p. 983.

The missionaries of Christianity from the sixteenth century onwards represent something like a cosmic force, a force which has arisen from the life and death of Yeshu the Christ, the Son of Mariam, and which is defying the natural laws of evolution and profoundly affecting the future of the human species, keeping it perhaps as a single species with local variations instead of allowing it by internecine warfare and isolation to become moulded into diverse species and ultimately into divergent genera. Man, if he remains one species as he is today, may succeed in completely conquering this planet from the recalcitrant

natural forces: and eventually in having a voice in the management of the solar system.

The missionaries of Christianity, especially in earlier days, may have wasted some time and effort in seeking to promulgate doctrines and dogmas, myths and theories as silly, as useless as those they came to refute in the religions of Asia, Africa and Polynesia, but they also, and increasingly, taught the great imperishable dogmas of Pity, of the Brotherhood of Mankind, of Sobriety, Continenence, Honesty, respect for Justice, Truth and Reason, and the maintenance of a healthy mind in a healthy body.

They broke down the barriers between the white, yellow, red, brown and black races of mankind which had arisen since the Neolithic age. They taught the races of colored skin to understand the white man as he really was, in his good and his bad aspects; and they taught or tried to teach the unwilling white listeners what the so-called savage, the so-called backward peoples wanted, deserved, expected, feared and were fit for. Their disinterestedness was complete, in the aggregate. They did not work for the gain of the white man, though they indirectly furthered his commerce and industries; neither did they conceal from the colored man his own grave deficiencies. They recommended a partnership between the two, a fusion of interests.—Sir Harry Johnston, in "World-Brotherhood," pp. 146, 147.

This war, far from representing the bankruptcy of Christianity, really represents a great advance in its conquest of the world; for it is the first war of which many people have said that it marks the collapse of our religion. In other words, it is only now that Europe has found out again that if nations were Christian there would be no war.—Rt. Rev. William Temple, Bishop of Manchester, "Christianity and War," p. 3.

Is not the power which will heal all our diseases an effective love by the nations for all their fellow peoples? I say an effective love, because there is plenty of sentimental love, and it has produced some very remarkable results, notably American works of relief throughout Europe. But the power which does the big things in the world is of a different kind. There was nothing sentimental about George Washington or the founders of the American constitution. There was nothing sentimental about Abraham Lincoln. The spirit which moved them was that

which was described by the Founder of Christianity when He said, "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends."

It is this spirit, and this spirit alone, which will bring the world to unity and peace. . . . Christianity has been the mightiest force for human freedom and progress in history, and the whole basis of the Sermon on the Mount is that the Kingdom of Heaven will be established on earth only by obeying moral and spiritual law.—Philip Henry Kerr, Open Conference Number Two, Institute of Politics, Williamstown, Mass., August 23, 1923.

Indeed, our work of reconciliation necessitates two forms of propaganda in Germany: One consists in urging democratic circles toward the logical conclusions of their own convictions, thus leading them to apply the moral principles of democratic thought to the great problems of world politics. The second consists in undermining the position of the Right by appealing primarily to the truths inherited from Christian tradition. Of the basically religious groups, the German Catholics, in the main, have displayed a mind very open to our ideas, whereas the Protestant groups have, for centuries back, thrown themselves completely into the arms of Caesar, in adoration of the Prussian state, which was regarded as the only secular support of the Evangelical Church. This is just the reverse of the state of affairs prevailing with you: In France it is particularly the Catholics who represent, in general, nationalist and Gallic sentiment; in Germany, Catholic tradition is, in the political field, the tradition of the old Germano-Roman Empire, where Germany was not a centralist and nationalist state, but an association of nations, and where the German considered himself responsible for the secular unity of Europe—Professor F. W. Foerster, formerly of the University of Munich, "Franco-German Reconciliation," an address delivered July 5, 1923, before the annual meeting of the Advisory Council in Europe of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The other Middle Eastern peoples may not approve of all the decisions taken in this revolutionary atmosphere. The Vaticanization of the caliphate, for example, may appear to many Indians and Egyptians to have been too drastic, too precipitate, too alien from Moslem tradition, or at any rate too high-handed a measure for the Turkish Great National Assembly to take upon itself

without previously consulting the representatives of the other leading Moslem peoples. But any one who imagines that the Moslems are going to fall out among themselves over this problem of the caliphate or any other domestic controversy is entirely misconceiving their state of mind. When I asked one of the Indian exiles at Angora a straight question on the subject, he answered that, if the Turks had been over hasty in regard to the caliphate, there was plenty of time to reconsider it later. My question had touched no tender spot; but the deeper chords of his emotion were struck a few moments later when a detachment of Turkish troops came marching up the road. "Just look at our soldiers," he exclaimed. "What splendid fellows they are!" The "our" dropped out unconsciously, but it revealed the motive that had carried him all the way to Angora from the Punjab. In fighting for itself, the Turkish nation has fought the battle of its sister peoples. In stemming the tide at the gates of Angora and rolling it back from Smyrna, Thrace, and Constantinople, it may have started an ebb which may conceivably continue to flow until Irak, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, Tunis, and even Algeria and India emerge again high and dry from the receding Western flood.—Arnold J. Toynbee, "Angora, Cinderella-Metropolis of Turkey," *Asia*, October, 1923.

CHAPTER VI

SELECTED READINGS

In the winter of 1916-17 Europeans put up to America a political puzzle just as complicated and difficult as is the puzzle of Europe today. It demanded a conditioned and measured solution. The American people were not ready to respond, but time pressed and they had to do something. The easiest way out was to fight and forget everything else. They did, but they will not repeat the exploit. Their political leaders cannot again skid them into a headlong dash through an unexplored country by subjecting them to the stern compulsion of military necessity. There is no avoiding the brain work which was as desirable in 1917, but in which at that time it was inefficient or unpatriotic to indulge.—Herbert Croly, "American Withdrawal from Europe," *The New Republic*, September 12, 1923, pp. 67-68.

You may ask, What is it that any one of us can do as individual citizens to improve the character of international relations, and especially to provide security against the outbreak of future wars? To answer this question let me say a few words bearing not only on the causes of war but on the whole subject of international policies which we have been studying. We have already seen how much violence and deceit there has been in the conduct of states towards one another, how much national ambition and national vanity, masquerading under the garb of patriotism, in the minds of peoples as well as among their leaders, and how the leaders have played upon these foibles and follies of the individual citizens. Now, what is a state? Nothing but so many individual citizens organized into one community. Such as the citizens are, such will the leaders be, because they desire to please the citizens. If the citizens are swayed by the impulses of vanity and ambition, their leaders will try to win support by playing up or playing down to such passions. If, on the other hand, the citizens demand from those who guide the state uprightness and fair dealing and a considerate respect for the rights of others, and if they reprobate and dismiss any statesman who falls below the moral standard they set up, their leaders will try to conform to that standard. If the moral standards of states have been generally lower than those of the average good citizens in a civilized country, why has this been so? Because rapacity and vanity and hatred and revenge are mitigated or reduced in private social life by sympathy, kindness and affection, these beneficent human feelings tempering or restraining or overcoming the bitter and unwholesome passions. In the relations of states these better feelings have had little or no scope and power, because men do not feel towards other states as they do feel towards their neighbors and acquaintances. If the sentiment of a common humanity which moves your hearts when you hear of sufferings in other countries, the sentiment which made you send splendidly generous gifts for the relief at one time of Sicilian sufferers from the earthquake at Messina and at another of Chinese peasants dying of famine, which led your government to remit the Boxer indemnities and made you as private citizens subscribe tens of millions of dollars to feed the children of the Armenian mothers slaughtered by the Turks in 1915—if that sentiment, coupled with the sense that all nations are the children of one Father in Heaven, were

to lay hold of the peoples of the world and make them regard the peoples of other countries as fellow-citizens in the commonwealth of mankind, would not the attitude of states towards one another be changed, and changed fundamentally for the better? Would not the sense of cooperation temper the eagerness of competition, and reinforce the belief that more will be gained for each and all by peace than has been gained or ever will be gained by war? You may say, What can private citizens do? Well, the state is made up of private citizens and such as they are such will the state be. Each of us as individuals can do little, but many animated by the same feeling and belief can do much. What is Democracy for except to represent and express the convictions and wishes of the people? The citizens of a democracy can do everything if they express their united will. The raindrops that fall from the clouds unite to form a tiny rill, and, meeting other rills, it becomes a rivulet, and the rivulet grows to a brook, and the brooks as they join one another swell into a river that sweeps in its resistless course downward to the sea. Each of us is only a drop, but together we make up the volume of public opinion which determines the character and action of a state. What all the nations now need is a public opinion which shall in every nation give more constant thought and keener attention to international policy, and lift it to a higher plane. The peoples can do this in every country if the best citizens give them the lead. You in America are well fitted to set an example in this effort to the European peoples smitten down by the war, and painfully struggling to regain their feet. They will gratefully welcome whatever you may do now or hereafter by sympathy and counsel or by active cooperation in efforts to redress the injustices and mitigate the passions which distract most parts of the Old World. Your help, your powerful and disinterested help, will be of incomparable service in every effort to rescue your brother peoples from the oldest and deadliest of all the evils that have afflicted mankind.—James Bryce, "International Relations," pp. 262-265.

CHAPTER VII

SELECTED READINGS

There are limits beyond which her [Italy's] ambitions for national expansion will not be permitted to go. In the old

days of the struggle for the unification of Italy there was a proud saying of her people, "Italy will do it alone." But she is not alone when her action disturbs the whole world. She cannot of herself decide that an act of war is not an act of war simply because it is committed against a nation too feeble to resist it. In all these matters Italy is bound to face, sooner or later, international opinion and international judgment. That these at present run so strongly against the course of the Italian government in the affair of Greece causes surprise and pain in Italy. But she ought to take to heart the true meaning of it all, which is that there is today a community of nations with established rules of right conduct which no one nation can violate without suffering the instant penalty of moral condemnation.—Editorial, "Italian Imperialism," *New York Times*, Sept. 4, 1923.

Suppose we could have said with complete honesty: "The profits of this piece of work which we propose to do in Mosul shall all of them remain in the country. Year by year they will constitute a fund which shall be used entirely for your benefit. With them we will build houses to replace your miserable huts. With them we will pay teachers for your children and doctors for your sick. Your fields shall be irrigated. Your flocks and herds and grain shall be raised from improved stocks and seeds. And since life is more than bread and meat, we aim also at something more. We will create in Bagdad, with the profits of this oil, a great Mohammedan university. We will bring back the glories of the Caliphs and restore the culture and the wealth that made of Bagdad one of the great cities of civilization. The oil we shall sell at a low price to the whole world that needs it. Our engineers shall receive adequate salaries. But the entire profits of the enterprise, after interest has been paid on the borrowed capital, belong to the people of Mesopotamia.—H. N. Brailsford, "After the Peace," pp. 168, 169.

It must, of course, be admitted that there are some virtuous acts expected from the good citizen which cannot be required from the state. The rulers of the state are in a certain sense agents and trustees acting on behalf of the people, and they are not entitled to go beyond such authority as the people have entrusted to them. They cannot, for instance, be generous with

what is not their own, as an individual may be generous with his own property.—James Bryce, "International Relations," p. 203.

The first duty of the state is to guard the interests of its own citizens, and it is only when the interests of those its citizens are identical with the interests of all mankind that the policy of a state can be human without being self-destructive.—Miss M. D. Petre, *Hibbert Journal*, April, 1920, p. 469.

All of us are being slowly, very slowly, purged of our particularistic desires. The egotistic satisfaction of giving things away is going to be replaced by the joy of owning things together. As our lives become more and more intricately interwoven, more and more I come to suffer not merely when I am undergoing personal suffering, more and more I come to desire not only when I am feeling personal desires.—M. P. Follett, "The New State," p. 80.

There is no path to peace except as the will of peoples may open it. The way to peace is through agreement, not through force. The question then is not of any ambitious general scheme to prevent war, but simply of the constant effort, which is the highest task of statesmanship in relation to every possible cause of strife, to diminish among peoples the disposition to resort to force and to find a just and reasonable basis for accord.

It is most desirable that all discussions of international relations should not revolve about questions of policy and expediency, however important these may be, but that along with this necessary discussion there should be the determination to re-establish the law, to quicken the sense of the obligation of states under the law. As soon as possible the codification of international law should be undertaken. It would be difficult to conceive a process requiring more deliberation and patience. For at every step the general consent of nations must be had, and at every step, except in the simplest matters, the opposing policy and objections of some nation will be encountered. The difficulty must be met by conference, and by conferences which have the sole object of promoting the codification and development of law.

Plans for commissions of inquiry, for periods of cooling off, for the use of good offices, are all important and may be efficacious to a gratifying extent. But these measures deal with

cases already aggravated, and it may well be doubted whether in grave crises they would avail.

We have to take account of both the advantages and disadvantages of democratization. It is generally thought that democracies are disposed to peace, but this is yet to be demonstrated where there is deep feeling and a national sense of injury. There are governments with an essentially democratic basis where the executive power is still able to conclude many important international agreements without reference to the legislature; but this is due to the persistence of special traditions. Usually in democracies there is a final or co-ordinate authority which rests with the parliament or legislature.

The more important the agreements, as insuring peace by settling bitter disputes, the more certain it is that they will involve mutual concessions. Thus in each country it is likely to be insisted that the other has gained at its expense, and this gives exceptional opportunity to critics who assume the most extreme positions on patriotic grounds.

I believe that we shall be able at no distant day to keep within reasonable limits some of our pressing economic rivalries by fair international agreements in which the self-interest of rivals will submit to mutual restrictions in the furtherance of friendly accord.—Hon. Charles E. Hughes, *New York Times*, Sept. 5, 1923.

CHAPTER VIII

SELECTED READINGS

The idea of the Nation is one of the most powerful anaesthetics that man has invented. Under the influence of its fumes the whole people can carry out its systematic program of the most virulent self-seeking without being in the least aware of its moral perversion—in fact feeling dangerously resentful if it is pointed out.—Rabindranath Tagore, "Nationalism," p. 57.

Nationalism is an attitude of mind in which we can combine with a passionate affection for and devotion to our own country a belief in mankind as a team in which each nation and race has its place—a team in which it is the part of each not to trip

the other up but to pass to him the ball.—Basil Mathews, *International Review of Missions*, July, 1923, p. 395.

As a matter of fact, is ours better than the other countries? There is no need for us, because we love it, to think so. We love it because we know it, and we should love them if we **knew** them as well and if the idea of rivalry were removed from our minds. Therefore our task is . . . to remove the idea of rivalry from our minds and all the illusions that spring from it. A nation is made up of men and women, and it cannot be Christian to other nations unless they in their thoughts and words are Christian to other nations. It is wrong thinking that causes war, and the thinking is done not by an abstract nation but by the men and women who compose it.—A. Clutton-Brock, "The Cure for War," p. 16.

But few would not also recognize that love of country is something very real and very valuable. We feel that a man who is devoid of any love for his country is unworthy of our respect. We rightly spurn him—as we despise a man who has no love for his mother.

Now, men love the world just as they love their country. All healthy people have this love of the world, though they are generally as unconscious of it as the philosopher was unaware that he has an enthusiastic love of his country burning at the bottom of his heart all the time.—Sir Francis Younghusband, *Hibbert Journal*, January, 1920, p. 303.

The true patriot is at home everywhere, because he will feel at home with other patriots, while the man without a country, whatever high-sounding name he may give himself, is at home nowhere, neither in the company of homeless theorists like himself nor in that of his own restless and solitary nature.—Alfred E. Zimmern, *Century Magazine*, September, 1923, p. 676.

If you find anywhere in the world, as, for example, we happily find in the case of our relations to our neighbor to the North, a complete assurance of lasting peace, it is not because of treaties or political arrangements of any sort; it is simply because the roots of amity strike deep in the thought and convictions of both peoples.—Address of Hon. Charles E. Hughes, May 17, 1923.

If the free peoples of the world really desire permanent peace, desire it earnestly enough to make it a primary object and to forgo some of their own independence of action to attain it, the thing may be tried with a fair prospect of success. What is needed is the creation, not only of a feeling of allegiance to humanity and of an interest in the welfare of other nations as well as one's own—what in fact may be called an international or supra-national mind—but also of an international public opinion, a common opinion of many peoples which shall apply moral standards to the conduct of other nations with a judgment biased less than now by the consideration of the particular national interests which each nation conceives itself to have.—James Bryce, "Essays and Addresses in War-time," p. 138.

The identification of "self" with society, which patriotism accomplishes within certain limits, the sacrifice of self for the community which it inspires—even though only when fighting other patriotism—are moral achievements of infinite hope.—Norman Angell, "The Fruits of Victory," p. 247.

If there was any one feature of the old, unhappy international code of ethics that the League was intended to deal with it was this argument of "national honor" which was trotted out on every conceivable occasion to make every government a law unto itself. Mussolini now talks "national honor." In the Covenant of the League it is expressly stated that it is the friendly right of any member of the League to bring before the attention of that body "any circumstance whatever" which threatens to disturb international peace. In other words, the old rule which enjoined silence on every bystander was abandoned by the nations when they subscribed to the Covenant. The Italian government now throws over this provision, which may be said to constitute the heart of the League in a much more real sense than Article X. For such cold-blooded repudiation of a solemn pledge there is nothing in the present problem that Italy can plead in extenuation. She has not been the subject of aggression. She cannot cite any peril from delay, such as has been quoted in excuse of the mobilizations and counter-mobilizations that lead to war. An attitude of restraint on Italy's part would have rallied a unanimous world opinion behind her demands for reparation for the murder of her citizens. Instead she chooses

to defy world opinion—*New York Evening Post*, September 4, 1923.

We cannot see our way to dispensing either with patriotism or with nationality. If, therefore, we are to help to build a wider organization than that of the nation-state, it must be a society of nations; and if such an organization is to have real life and success, it must not merely not conflict with state-patriotism; it must actually enlist this patriotism in its service.—J. L. Stocks, "Patriotism and the Super-State." p. 80.

The true contact between the West European national triangle which is so disquieting the world must be a contact, not between trust-magnates or labor-leaders or even statesmen from the three countries, but, so to speak, between Shakespeare, Moliere and Goethe. It is the most characteristic figures of a national literature who are also the most international, and it is through them that understanding must come. Our efforts at internationalism have failed hitherto because they have followed the line of least effort. Any fool can book a ticket for a foreign country, just as any fool can learn Esperanto. But contacts so established effect nothing. They tell us no more than that the German or the Frenchman is a human being, a father, a workman and a lover of beer or coffee, which we knew before. It is through a deeper exploration and enjoyment of the infinite treasures of the world's nationalities, by men and women whose vision has been trained and sensibilities refined because they themselves are intimately bound up with a nation of their own, that an enduring network of internationalism will some day be knit and a harmony of understanding established in a world of unassailable diversity.—Alfred E. Zimmern, "Nationalism and Internationalism," *Foreign Affairs*, June 15, 1923, p. 126.

CHAPTER IX

SELECTED READINGS

If war is outlawed, other means of redress of injuries must be provided. Moreover, few, if any, intend to outlaw self-defense, a right still accorded to individuals under all systems of law. To meet this difficulty, the usual formula is limited to wars of

aggression. But justification for war, as recently demonstrated, is ready at hand for those who desire to make war, and there is rarely a case of admitted aggression, or where on each side the cause is not believed to be just by the peoples who support the war.—Hon. Charles E. Hughes, *New York Times*, Sept. 5, 1923.

The freedom to choose one's own course of action is the very essence of nationality, as it is of manhood, and encroachment upon it is a subtle attack upon national existence. Nothing is more insidious than for a nation to form the habit of yielding to argument or pressure from a powerful neighbor. The essence of freedom may thus entirely disappear, while the semblance of independence remains as a deceptive mask. When the king of Syria, on his way to attack the king of Egypt, yielded to the advice of a Roman legate to return home and abandon the campaign, we are prepared for the unnoticed transformation of Syria a little later into a Roman province. It is a sound instinct which impels men everywhere to resent interference with their national freedom of action, even though the guidance proffered be reasonable and considerate. This is the essence of the vaguely defined term national honor.—H. H. Powers, "The Things Men Fight For," p. 12.

In dealing with rival states the problem is unfortunately more complex than that which arises between individuals. It is the duty of the individual to be friendly, humane, and generous to all; and he may find it to be his duty to sacrifice himself for his friend, or even for his enemy. But no such law of sacrifice can justly be applied to states. . . . Sacrifice for a nation may simply be breach of trust. The nation's first duty is to defend its people and their interests against the cupidity, fraud or violence of other states.—John Kelman, "Some Aspects of International Christianity," p. 75.

What do nations fight for? Or, more definitely, what may a nation fight for, with a fair prospect of commanding the sympathy and approval of disinterested men? What, in a word, may be fairly accounted as just causes of war? Defense of its own soil must undoubtedly come first. No doubt there are times when the invasion of a nation's territory has a large measure of justification, as a result of long continued unneighborliness and provo-

cative acts, but the nation that takes the initiative in such an invasion assumes a heavy responsibility and must usually expect but grudging sympathy from a jealous world. The sanctity of territory is a solemn tenet of our political philosophy, akin to the sanctity of life in individual relations, and to repel invasion is as well recognized a right as the right of individual self-defence. Even if a nation has forfeited the sympathy of the world, and the right of the invader is grudgingly conceded, it never forfeits the right of self-defence, and the duty of its citizens to rally to its defence is never questioned. So firmly established is this principle of national self-defence that even the most confirmed pacifists usually freely concede it.—H. H. Powers, "The Things Men Fight For," p. 9.

CHAPTER X

SELECTED READINGS

We speak of the Spirit of the Reformation or the Spirit of Revolt or the Spirit of Disorder and Anarchy. The papers tell us that "Berlin says," "London says," "Uncle Sam so decides," "John Bull is disgruntled." Now, whether or no there are such things as spirits, Berlin and London have no souls, and Uncle Sam is as mythical as the great god Pan. Sometimes this regression to the savage is harmless, but when a newspaper states that "Germany is as militaristic as ever," on the ground that some insolent Prussian lieutenant says that German armies will occupy Paris within five years, we have an example of animism which in a society farther removed from savagery than ours might be deemed a high crime and a misdemeanor. Chemists and physicians have given up talking of spirits, but in discussing social and economic questions we are still victimized by the primitive animistic tendencies of the mind.—James Harvey Robinson, "The Mind in the Making," pp. 88, 89.

China, at the mercy of the invading armies sent to suppress the Boxer Rebellion (1900), was forced to pay large indemnities, not only to cover the actual losses incurred by foreigners but to serve as "punitive damages" for her action. On July 11, 1908, our government informed the Chinese government that it

would return the amount over and above the expenses and losses of the United States and its citizens. This was an act unprecedented in diplomatic history, for the United States had a perfect legal right to retain the entire award without returning the excess above actual losses. The Chinese government expressed its appreciation of the spirit which had prompted this act, and announced that it would set aside the sum as a fund for sending Chinese students to American universities. One hundred such students a year were sent for the first four years and since then fifty of the best Chinese students have come over every year—a striking memorial to our act of justice and fair dealing. Twelve hundred students from China are now in our colleges and universities, the majority of them at their own expense. When John Hay, as Secretary of State, cabled his famous message about foreign concessions in China, he was putting into practice the spirit of the Golden Rule. The permanence of the “open-door policy” is due largely to its moral justification.—Sidney L. Gulick, “The Christian Crusade for a Warless World,” pp. 24, 25.

A body politic though it may seem to vary by a succession of new members, continues the same, as long as it retains its form. In which case it seems liable to punishment no less than individuals.—Hugo Grotius, “The Rights of War and Peace,” p. 261.

It is therefore not strange that anger is difficult to appraise with an impartial hand; and that wherever morals come to high development, anger should be viewed askance. A hundred strands of evidence reveal the deep distrust with which anger comes to be viewed. There can be no doubt of an effort in morals to have good-will wholly displace anger and hate. Yet are morals to be the better if this effort is crowned with success? Can morality dispense with so doubtful a means? Shall we find good-will strengthened if freed from this embarrassing retainer?—who is helpful, no doubt, but with a troublesome help such as was rendered to those Italian noblemen of old by their hired bravoës. To deal justly with anger and hate and pugnacity is a moral problem of deep concern. And it is to religion that men have long looked for guidance in making their decision. And perhaps nowhere has religion seemed in more perplexity. It has used and again condemned all anger. Accord-

ing to its time and place, religion has anxiously taken now one and now another horn of the dilemma.—George M. Stratton, "Anger," pp. 71-72.

When you see the helpless outraged, is it your business to forgive? No, I think not, but I will tell you who it is that can forgive, and so break the entail of evil, who can do justice without violating justice: those who were outraged.

If the victim forgives, surely a higher kind of justice becomes possible than we had dreamed of. Is it not conceivable that if the victim forgave, if the tortured and the oppressed themselves pleaded for the torturer and the oppressor, there would be done a higher justice than we had dreamed of, and this ghastly fate which shadows the destinies of man, which brings civilization after civilization to ruin because none of them is based upon divine justice, would be broken? . . .

We seek a diviner, higher justice than we have been able to see for ourselves; in the light of that justice, ignoring nothing that has been done wrong, seeking to overlook no difficulty, not finding an easy way out of our own difficulties at the expense of other people, but with the heart-searching desire to build our city with foundations, to make of the civilization of the future one not based on injustice and wrong. Let us Christian people approach our great problem in this light, and as far as we ourselves and our own country are concerned let us seek first of all to forgive. Whoever has suffered in this war let him begin, let her begin. Whoever is himself or herself a victim, let this newer, diviner justice begin with them. Let whatever we do be done with the sense of forgiveness in our hearts, not enforcing our attitude on our nations, but for ourselves.—A. Maude Royden, "Political Christianity," pp. 27, 28-29.

If we classify all international controversies into two great classes,—*first*, disputes behind which, on one side or both, lie ulterior evil or illegitimate designs of aggression or attack upon the rights of other nations, and *second*, disputes arising spontaneously and without ulterior designs, it is obvious that none of those of the first class would be subject to treatment in any of the modes already considered [courts of arbitration and judicial courts], and indeed that under present conditions nothing but war or the fear of war would prove adequate to prevent the threatened attack. The offender in such case would doubtless

put forward untenable claims as an excuse for his oppressive and tyrannical conduct, but such claims would not be justiciable, that is, capable of settlement in a court of justice or arbitration, because the offender does not intend, and would not allow, them to be thus settled. For the like reason, commissions of inquiry, conciliation, mediation, good offices, and diplomatic protests would all alike be of no avail. His design is to use force or fraud against his neighbor and under existing conditions nothing but force or the fear of it will deter him.

Suppose, for example, a nation urged by dynastic, military, or territorial ambitions bent on taking the territory of its neighbor; or suppose it, influenced by cupidity and greed of wealth, determined to capture forcibly or fraudulently, and without regard to the rights of its neighbors, certain trade routes or seats of commercial influence, or resolved, by the use of tariffs or the unfair use of a favorable geographical position, to engage in unfair competition against other nations; or suppose it, influenced by the spirit of nationalism, to contemplate a union of those of its race who are the subjects of neighboring powers through the use of force; or suppose it is filled with a desire to overawe and bully its neighbors, so that it indulges to a dangerous extent in militarism and jingoism. These are not uncommon manifestations among the nations, and none of them are justiciable or remediable in any way except by war or the threat of it.

But this is not the only class of disputes wherein the remedies before mentioned would be often inadequate to prevent war. Even in the case of honest disputes behind which lurks no evil design of aggression, many, indeed most, would not be justiciable, and could only be adjusted, short of war, through diplomacy, the good offices of mutual friends, mediation, compromise, or possibly arbitration. Whether they would actually be settled in any of these modes or would lead to war would depend, as such matters always have depended, on the self-restraint of the nations involved and the earnestness of their desire to reach a peaceful settlement.—Raleigh C. Minor, "A Republic of Nations," pp. 12-14.

CHAPTER XI

SELECTED READINGS

It is clearly easier to arouse large audiences to a denunciation of war in general than it is to persuade them to agree on the principles of a code. Men agree that war is a horror and a crime. They do not agree easily on the fixing of boundaries, the right to secede, the right of revolution, the control of raw materials, access to the sea, the rights of minorities, tariffs, immigration, the status of colonies, the rights of property. They do not agree easily about what constitute, in Mr. Borah's words, "purely international controversies." People are fairly unanimous against war. They are wholly unanimous in their professions of love for "equality and justice." But they quarrel fearfully about what is just and what is equal. They are divided over the general principles which ought to decide great issues. They are even more divided over the interpretation of the facts in specific cases under general principles.—Walter Lippmann, *Atlantic Monthly*, August, 1923, p. 248.

No individual is either really at peace or free until he submits himself to the wisdom of the Ten Commandments. No community is at peace or free in which the citizens do not submit themselves to the restraint of their country's constitution and laws. The Pilgrim Fathers saw that very clearly. And nations, similarly, will be neither at peace nor free until they unite to bring themselves under the reign of just law.

Mere benevolence will never keep the peace among the nations, any more than it will keep the peace among individuals—in their present state of moral growth—without the restraint of obedience to law, and without the machinery whereby disputes can be settled impartially according to law, and fighting is prohibited and prevented. If law is indispensable in the civilized community of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, what reason have we for thinking that it is not even more necessary among the estranged and suspicious communities of men? If nations cannot trust one another enough to unite to frame a means of settling disputes according to justice, what possible ground is there for thinking that they will always manage to settle them by voluntary agreement? As William Penn said, "Government is the means of justice, as justice is the means of peace."

We have not got to wait till man has realized perfection before we create the machinery of the reign of law. When he is perfect he won't need it. . . .

War will only be abolished from the earth when the peoples of the world, or at any rate the civilized peoples, combine under some organic constitution whereby international questions are settled by an appeal to law designed to promote international justice, law which is obeyed and enforced by all mankind, until it can be modified by constitutional means. That is the basis of peace and civilized government everywhere in democratic communities today. . . .

Before going on to consider the practical application of this conclusion, let us consider for a moment the alternatives which are usually put forward. Take first of all disarmament. . . . I would not lift a finger to discourage the campaign. On the contrary I would help it in every way, unless it were represented as a final solution in itself. It is a step in the right direction. But it does not solve the problem. No nation can or will abandon its armaments altogether until it has both an alternative method of protection and a system in which it has confidence whereby disputes with its neighbors can be justly and honorably decided. . . . And if there is no alternative system, nations will, sooner or later, be landed in war. If they are not united enough to form a common machinery for the conduct of their common affairs, it is a pure delusion to think that they will be able to escape disagreements or to avoid settling those disagreements by fighting.

What about the international court? This also is a step in the right direction, for it accustoms men to think of justice as the true arbiter of international problems. But international courts by themselves cannot suffice. Courts of law interpret law, adapt law to the changing facts of human life, develop law; they do not enact it. . . . No body of a judicial or unrepresentative character could possibly solve the vast problems relative to the color line, to the development of self-government among backward peoples, to the control of world markets and supplies of raw materials, which are increasingly going to convulse mankind. These are political matters, not judicial, and must be settled by political means.

What about the system of international conference, either temporary like the Washington conference, or permanent like

the League of Nations? . . . I entirely endorse the underlying idea of a League or Association, call it what you will, of all the nations of the earth, to deliberate about world problems. Some such regular institution is essential to international understanding and without it no progress whatever towards world peace can be made. But no such body can, in itself, end war. At the very highest it can only do what your Confederation did between 1781 and 1789. It will ultimately fail to solve the international problem for exactly the same reason as the Confederation failed to solve the American problem. The Confederation failed because, its members being delegates, it tended to approach every issue as a matter of adjusting the conflicting interests of separate states, and not from the standpoint of what was best for the American people as a whole. It failed still more because even when it could agree upon the wise solution it could not give effect to it, because its decisions were only effective if they were simultaneously accepted and carried out by thirteen separate legislatures, widely scattered, and each looking at the question from its own point of view. As you all know, the system broke down hopelessly, as it has broken down in Canada, Australia, South Africa, Germany, everywhere where it has been tried, and a federal system had to be erected in its place. It will be exactly the same with a League or Association of all nations. It is a step in the right direction. But a League or Association of absolutely independent sovereign nations will ultimately fail, partly because its members will be delegates and forced to discuss world problems as a matter of bargaining between their separate states, and partly because even when it can reach unanimity, its conclusions, however good, will never be accepted or carried out simultaneously by more than fifty separate states, scattered all over the world, and wholly immersed in their own point of view.

I think every dispassionate thinker will agree that none of these expedients, admirable as they are, as steps in international cooperation, can ever, by themselves, end war. I would go further. Unless people see clearly what is the ultimate goal and recognize that these methods are just steps towards that goal they may become that dangerous thing, the paper screen. They send the world to sleep; they make it think that it is dealing with the real causes of war, whereas it is not, so that eventually it finds itself suddenly awakened, as in 1914, to the horrible reality by the shriek of the bullet and the roar of the guns.

I don't want to be misunderstood as being against international cooperation. I am for it, to the limit, in every helpful form. It is the only practical method of reaching agreement and diminishing the risk of war today. All I am concerned with is to point to what I believe to be the fundamental truth, that the only method of finally ending war, and therefore of establishing freedom for all nations on the earth, is to apply to the world as a whole the same fundamental ideas which have alone given peace and liberty and opportunity in its separate parts.—Philip Henry Kerr, "The Prevention of War," lectures delivered before the Institute of Politics, Williamstown, Mass., August, 1922, and published late in 1923 by the Yale University Press.

Special conferences, like those recently held in Washington and Genoa, have their legitimate and proper place in the regulation of the world's affairs. Their attention, however, is necessarily limited to the specific purposes for which they were called; when their business is concluded they adjourn, and nothing remains of the machinery which they erected. They create no organic, continuing relationships. This type of conference helps the world along, but it fails the world in time of unexpected crisis.—Raymond B. Fosdick, *Atlantic Monthly*, August, 1922, pp. 257, 258.

It seems to me that there is one measure that would at least concentrate and direct moral sentiments and moral desires and emotions, which are certainly still widespread amid our intellectual confusion and uncertainty. *Law* has always served the purpose of condensing and defining the moral wishes and expectations of the community. No matter how much it is behind the highest moral aspirations of the developed members of the community, law has precipitated average moral sentiment in a way that has rendered it more effective than it would otherwise be. It has canalized moral emotions so that they may flow to a purpose. Changing the metaphor, it has given them positive leverage.

Now it seems to me that there is one legal change, which, were it made, would effect an enormous change in clarifying the present situation and would give the development of sound ideas and valid practices a great impetus. I refer to the movement . . . for the outlawry of war. Under present interna-

tional law war is legal. There is indeed no such thing as illegal war, except the kind of war that appears to most persons the most justifiable from the moral standpoint—internal wars of liberation. War is not only legal; it is the *most* authorized method of settling disputes between nations that are intense. Resort to organized force is the *ultima ratio* of states. This fact constitutes by far the greatest gap that exists in any realm of life between moral sentiment and authorized practice. With respect to all lesser disputes there are regular methods of settlement which are alone legal. There are laws, courts and procedures for settling them. I am not hopeful that causes of disputes between nations will cease any more than causes of disputes between individuals. But we no longer permit individuals to settle disputes by waging private war; even in cases when honor is impugned the duel is outlawed.

I do not see how anybody who faces the situation can do otherwise than be convinced that the legality of war constitutes the greatest anomaly that now anywhere exists in morals.

As long as it persists, moral sentiment is in a self-contradictory position; there is a double standard of moral ideas introducing an almost hopeless conflict, till a person has no choice except between belligerent loyalty to his own community and a non-resistant pacifism which comes close to moral passivism. The outlawing of war as a method of settling national disputes under any circumstances, with the attendant institution of courts having complete jurisdiction in disputes that might lead to war, operating under a carefully thought out code, would put an end to this fatal moral dualism.

Community of moral feeling exists even among those of diverse intellectual moral beliefs. The outlawing of war provides a common center for the expression of this community of moral emotion and desire. International law against war would produce the same condensing, precipitating, crystallizing effect for morals with respect to international relations that law has supplied everywhere else in its historic development. It is the logical completion of the historic development of courts as the instrumentalities for settling disputes, and until it is reached the influence of moral sentiment is split and scattered.

The argument is not that wars would necessarily cease. Laws have not prevented other crimes; it may be that war though a crime would still be resorted to. But the person who believes

that law which should brand war for what it is instead of permitting it as legal would have no effect, has a peculiar view of history and human nature. There is an old saying that what the sovereign permits he commands. It is not needful to take this saying literally to recognize that the existing legal sanction of war inevitably confers upon it a moral sanction which in the end encourages war. What law authorizes is a powerful influence in determining moral ideas and aspirations in the mass of men. But above all what is asserted is that until war is outlawed by conjoint international action there is no opportunity for existing moral sentiments to function effectively in international relations, and next to no hope for the speedy development of a coherent and widely accepted body of moral ideas which will be effective in determining international relations. The first move in improving international morality is to outlaw war. Till this move is taken I do not see much chance that any other improvement in international relations will win general assent or be practicable in execution.—John Dewey, "Ethics and International Relations," *Foreign Affairs*, March 15, 1923, pp. 94, 95.

The peace of the world will be unstable just so long as individuals or groups can go into backward countries, obtain concessions, make investments, develop vast private interests, and depend on the home government to enforce their claims and defend their interests. Under such conditions every undeveloped country, where are to be found rich resources and a defective political and social order, becomes a breeding-place of wars.

Somehow the international order, if it is to be powerful and permanent, must deal with this problem. Shall national backing of individual investors be henceforth outlawed? Shall industrial groups take their own risk? Shall international commissions or syndicates be formed to see fair play, and to adjust rival claims? Certainly that proposition has in it an added advantage, in that it would enhance the prestige of the international government, by giving to it real and great powers. Shall an International Bank be set up, from which, and from which alone, nations needing funds for their development may obtain credits, subject to careful oversight by an international commission?—William Pierson Merrill, "Christian Internationalism," p. 123.

To Greeks so fearless in mind as Plato and Aristotle a commonwealth larger than a single city was inconceivable. They

were unable to foresee the two great political inventions of the Anglo-Saxon race, representation and federation. I point to this warning, because today practical statesmen assume, and act upon the assumption, that commonwealths on the scale of the United States are the largest units of mankind to which the rule of law properly so-called can ever be applied. That nations on this scale are forever to remain in a state of nature to each other, that the widest and most important of human relations are always to remain in the realm of anarchy, is accepted as an axiom by rational minds. The vision of a world commonwealth may serve as the theme of peroration; but a public man suspected of using that ideal as the practical criterion of policy in international affairs is in real danger. I am not referring to those whose outlook is purely national. To them a policy is right or wrong only in so far as it tends to the material loss or gain of their country. But to those who have risen to a point of view which deserves to be called international the test usually applied to policies is simply whether they make for peace or war. Now for nations to accept peace as the criterion of policy is exactly as though men were to seek physical health as the criterion of conduct. People whose lives are regulated mainly by physical health become hypochondriacs, and miss the very object they seek. He that seeks to save his life shall lose it. Amongst people whose conduct is guided by the aim to live rightly the general level of physical health will be far higher. And so with states. To nations the state of peace stands in much the same relation as physical health to the individual. But health is only one element and by no means the chief one, in well being, which is best described in the trite phrase *mens sana in corpore sano*—a sound body regulated by a well-ordered mind. The right system of society is one composed of such men, and therefore one calculated to reproduce them in a higher degree and in greater numbers.

As health is worth risking for right living, so is health a product of right living. And as peace is worth risking for freedom, so peace is a product of freedom. He that seeks to lose his life shall save it. The principle I have to submit for your serious consideration is that the test by which all policies should be proved is not whether they tend to maintain peace, but whether they tend to advance freedom amongst men. . . .

Here again he that seeks to save his life shall lose it. To neglect freedom and pursue peace as the aim of human endeavor is

to end by destroying both; for anarchy is the negation not only of law but also of liberty. The true lesson to be learned from Russia is less the folly of neglecting order than the unwisdom of failing to found it on responsibility. To study India as a microcosm is also to understand the peril of treating peace as the test of policy in international affairs. . . .

The commonwealth is not an end in itself, but exists only to propagate freedom in the souls of men, which, rightly understood, is a sense of responsibility in themselves for others. In so far as it succeeds in this object the commonwealth will flourish, but its visible success is to be valued only as a sign that its function in promoting the growth of human souls is in active process. A commonwealth which is not progressive towards democracy is in danger of losing sight of its ultimate goal. . . .

Men must be given scope to hurt themselves without destroying themselves. The problem you have to face in the Philippines and we have to face in India, is how much scope you can give the people to hurt themselves without destroying the fabric of government altogether. . . .

The relations of the peoples of Europe and America to those of Asia and Africa is, I have submitted, the ultimate problem of politics. The real question is how to bring those relations within the realm of law properly so called. The solution of that problem involves the creation of a commonwealth large enough to include not merely cities, districts or provinces, but whole nations, each with a national government of its own. And before you reject this conclusion as the dream of a visionary, I ask you to reflect that nations together equal to a fourth of mankind have already been brought within the scope of one paramount law. The international state mis-called the British empire, is a genuine commonwealth of nations in the making. . . . This vast congeries of nations in matters of peace and war stands to all other nations outside their circle as one international state. They are all at peace or at war together. . . .

It has always seemed to me strange that cosmopolitans who dream of a world government and a parliament of man go out of their way to condemn any institution which is in fact a practical step towards their ideal. They are blind to actual achievements, and have eyes only for their failures and defects. If we had but vision the figure of our dreams is about us in the making. Its substance is here to be handled and seen.

The angels keep their ancient places;
Turn but a stone, and start a wing.
'Tis we, 'tis our estranged faces
That miss the many splendored thing.

The incorporation of great sections of Asia and Africa in one world commonwealth affords the best conditions under which those races can attain to the verities of responsible government; provided always that those in whom political power already vests continue to realize that the growth of responsible government, and not peace, is the ultimate goal in view. The basic problem of the world, that of bringing the peoples of Europe, Asia and Africa into some stable relation with each other, is destined, I believe, to be solved only in terms of the state inspired by the principles of the commonwealth. We are fatally inclined to think of liberty as something opposed to the rule of law, and to see in the state the negation of freedom. The rule of law is coincident with the state, and men achieve freedom only in so far as more communities can be gathered in the circle of a single polity.

A time has arrived when a further extension of freedom depends on our power of solving the problem—how to include in one commonwealth without destroying its character as such, whole nations in varying stages of progress. The essence of freedom is self-discipline. Her sternest aspect is the state, and through all the ages men have fled her approach, in their blindness avoiding the refuge they desire. . . .

Religion and politics are but two aspects of life; to ignore one is to miss the meaning of the other. The principle of the commonwealth is love, and the sense of duty to each other which love inspires in men. And so it has moved down the ages, clothed in the stern attributes of the state, bursting the walls of cities, effacing the frontiers of nations, transcending the oceans and bridging their coasts. And so it will move until it has breached the barriers which divide the races of men and continents of the world, till freedom shall cover the whole earth as the waters cover the sea.—Lionel Curtis, "A Criterion of Value in International Affairs," a lecture delivered before the Institute of Politics, Williamstown, Mass., August 8, 1922. To be published late in 1923.

CHAPTER XII

SELECTED READINGS

Are Christian principles more likely to influence the conduct of nations in the future than they have influenced it in the past? That question is as dark today as ever it was before—James Bryce, "Essays and Addresses in War-time," p. 129.

The fatherhood of God has been preached by Christians for over eighteen centuries, and the brotherhood of man by the Stoics long before them. The doctrine has proved compatible with slavery and serfdom, with wars blessed, and not infrequently instigated, by religious leaders, and with industrial oppression which it requires a brave clergyman or teacher to denounce to-day. . . . There is, beyond doubt, a natural kindliness in mankind which will show itself under favorable auspices. But experience would seem to teach that it is little promoted by moral exhortation.—James Harvey Robinson, "The Mind in the Making," pp. 17, 18.

What has become of the last trace of decent feeling, of self-respect, when our statesmen, otherwise an unconventional class of men and thoroughly anti-Christian in their acts, now call themselves Christians and go to the communion table? . . . A prince at the head of his armies, magnificent as the expression of the egoism and arrogance of his people—and yet acknowledging without any shame that he is a Christian! . . . Whom then, does Christianity deny? *What* does it call "the World"? To be a *soldier*, to be a judge, to be a patriot; to defend one's self; to be careful of one's honor; to desire one's own advantage; to be *proud* . . . every act of every day, every instinct, every valuation that shows itself in a *deed* is now anti-Christian: what a monster of *falsehood* the modern man must be to call himself nevertheless and *without* shame, a Christian!—F. W. Nietzsche, "The Anti-Christ," Translated by H. L. Mencken, pp. 110, 111.

Christian morality is based, indeed, on the law of love. "Love God above all things and thy neighbor as thyself." This law can claim no significance for the relations of one country to another, since its application to politics would lead to a conflict of duties. The love which a man showed to another country as such would imply a want of love for his own countrymen. Such

a system of politics must inevitably lead men astray. Christian morality is personal and social, and in its nature cannot be political.—F. von Bernhardi, "Germany and the Next War," p. 29.

What world-outlook will take the place now occupied by Christianity in our social heritage, and in what way will it affect the life of mankind? To that question no one, I believe, can give a simple answer. New religions of the type of Buddhism and Christianity and Mohammedanism and Bahaism, where a supernatural mythology forms itself round the facts of a religious teacher's life, will appear, but are not likely, in the presence of the modern newspaper reporter and photographer, and the atmosphere of modern science to spread over the world. Something more like the "philosophies" of Zeno and Epicurus in the Roman Empire may have a better chance. If our educational systems are not starved by war and the consequences of war, they may so develop that whole populations will have access to the outlines of agreed knowledge and the emotional appeal of great literature. Differences in mental training may follow differences of individual nature, and not differences of hereditary class or caste. If so, Bagehot's assumption that political authority must be based on "the credulous obedience of enormous masses," and the corresponding assumption underlying the phrase, "the Mass for the Masses," may seem less convincing than they do now, and many social and professional and racial hindrances to the free exchange of thought may be broken down. A book of sayings by some countryman of Confucius or Laotze, who has known Western civilization and has accepted it without dread and without illusion as an instrument of the good life, may then seem true, not only in Peking and the cities of the Yangtze valley, but to many thoughtful men and women in New York and London and Moscow and Milan. Artisans and teachers and societies of college students may begin to use some term like "The Path," for an ethical plan based on a common world-outlook and making a common emotional appeal. It may be that there will be several such competing "philosophies," existing side by side with the many new and old "religions." No attempt, such as was made in Czarist Russia, to enforce religious uniformity within any nation by state persecution is now probable.

But meanwhile, in the national educational systems, in the celebration of great events, in the use of periodical days of leisure

and of reflection, and in many sides of the development of the arts of music and painting and literature, the need will still be felt for means by which emotions common to the great majorities of whole populations can be expressed. On November 11, 1918, as I came back from telling the news of the armistice to a family of Belgian exiles who had wept with joy, I passed the buildings of a big endowed school. The boys were assembled in the hall, and were apparently singing all the doggerel verses of "God Save the King." I listened, trying to imagine the hymns that were being sung before other national flags in all the schools of the Allies; and a conviction swept through me that the special task of our generation might be so to work and think as to be able to hand on to the boys and girls who fifty years hence, at some other turning point of world-history, may gather in the schools, the heritage of a world-outlook deeper and wider and more helpful than that of modern Christendom.—Graham Wallas, "Our Social Heritage," pp. 289-291.

The unfolding of the Christian religion in the West has been a record of fighting and slaughter aiming at worldly triumph which is absolutely unparalleled in any other phase of the history of the race. In all the developments in which we see the West endeavoring to present to the human mind the tremendous ideals of the Christian religion, one aim seems almost invariably at some stage to become dominant in the fighting mind of those who have held power in the West. In the development of its churches, of its creeds, of its nationalities, of its theories of the state in relation to civilization, the West has continuously made interpretations of the interest or of the aims of the Christian religion, or of some system of national policy proceeding from them, the occasion for entrenching itself in absolutisms always resting on force, always organized by force, and always aiming directly or indirectly to impose themselves by force on other people.—Benjamin Kidd, "The Science of Power," pp. 158, 159.

When all credit is given where credit is due, when all has been said that can be said of the use which the world has made of Christianity, with profound reverence for those holy lives which are "Christ in miniature" and deep respect for every organization and social influence of which Jesus Christ has been the inspiration, still it is painfully apparent that Christianity has never moulded any age into a Christian civilization. Looking back-

ward we fail to find a chapter on Christian civilization written by the achievements of the past. Looking about us in the present, we discover that in the fabric of modern life only here and there by broken threads can we trace the influence of Christian ideals.—John William Frazer, "The United Civilization," p. 28.

In this twentieth century we have seen Christian Europe hating and fighting exactly as did heathen Europe in the past. Christian Germany has left a record of conduct which we may mildly term inconsistent with that faith. Christian Ireland is a beautiful example of forgiveness, patience, and loving one another. Our own Christian nation maintained slavery after every other advanced people had outgrown it, and still stands black before the world in that most hideous of savage practices, the slow torturing to death of helpless prisoners—"lynching."

The Christian belief has been taught all over the world, but it has not established connection with life. Its revivalists still make their passionate appeal on a basis of what is to happen to you after death.—Charlotte Perkins Gilman, *Century Magazine*, March, 1923, p. 679.

How has it come to pass that respectable Christian apologists have fallen into such flagrant dishonesties?

The cause, I believe, lies in the habit . . . of applying carnal logic (admirable for carnal purposes) to divine things, not judging spiritual things by spiritual. Anyone who studies this class of apologetics will be struck by their resemblance to a well-known type of political speech, when the spokesman of some discredited government which has broken all the promises given at the election, attempts to befool his constituents into believing that the promises have been kept. It is all a matter of artfully adjusting the emphasis—the art, as somebody has said, "of keeping the public quiet about one thing by making them noisy about another." There is, I say, a significant resemblance between this method and that of the Christian apologist when, for example, he exalts the benevolence promoted by Christianity and ignores the parallel fact that no other religion has developed such ferocious internal differences nor been so cruel in its persecution of unbelievers. There have been moments in the history of Christianity—or of what was called so, when the slaughter of a million men, or the wiping out of an entire civilization, meant no more to the leaders of the Church than it did, by his own

confession, to Napoleon. Witness the treatment meted out by Cortes, in the name of Christ and of his Holy Mother, to the Aztecs of Mexico. But the searchlight is seldom switched on to these things, and even when it is, "slow and gradual" will cover them.

This application of carnal logic to things divine, this judging the success of Christianity by the standard of success which passes muster in the crime-stained record of human society—as though it were the business of religion to keep pace with the dawdling, creeping, cowardly movement of mankind to better things, and not to hasten it with urgent calls to repent of its hesitancy—this is only one form, though perhaps the crowning form, in which the Kingdom that is not of this world has been surrendered by its deluded guardians to the kingdoms which are. In that surrender, so long an established fact that we have lost sight of its malign implications, so deeply engrained into our mental habits that we have almost forgotten that it exists, lies the true cause of the failure of Christianity, and incidentally of its once atrocious tendency to persecute. For failure most unquestionably there has been: tragic but not irretrievable, if men have the courage to face the facts. Let it be acknowledged! Let an end come swiftly to the invention of sophistries to prove the contrary. That way lies failure deeper still.

The Christian religion, in the course of its long history, has become entangled with a multitude of things which do not properly belong to it, with philosophies, with dogmatic systems, with political ideas, with the vested interests of great institutions; and especially with the habits of mind which have grown up with these things, this last, the entanglement with deeply entrenched habits of mind, being the most formidable of them all. These entanglements are another name for our perplexities. They are so many and so deep that it becomes a matter of difficulty to extract the original genius of Christianity, to recover its original impulse and power.

It has become the fashion to rejoice in these entanglements. Men say that Christianity, by becoming entangled with these foreign elements, has permeated them with its spirit, acting upon them like leaven and so transfiguring them with its own value. That view I cannot share: at least not without great reservations. Were it not truer to say that these foreign elements, these outside things, these worldly philosophies and insti-

tutions, have rather permeated Christianity with their spirit than suffered Christianity to permeate them with its own? No one in his senses will deny that Christianity has done something to make these worldly things better. They would all be much worse than they are if Christianity had never touched them. But, on the other hand, Christianity would be much better than it is if they had never touched it. They have distorted it; have maimed it; have devitalized it at essential points. Dean Inge is speaking the truth when he says that Christianity has become secularized. It has become secularized not only in its outward form, but in something far deeper, namely, in its habits of thought, in its standard of values, and especially in its strivings for power, this last being the characteristic vice of the kingdoms that are of this world. Is it not a fact that for a long time past the churches of Christendom have been engaged in strife as to who shall be greatest? There can be no surer sign of secularization than that.

Christianity, in the official or authorized presentation of it, is a *smothered* religion; smothered almost to the point of total asphyxiation and collapse, but not quite; smothered by the vested interests of great institutions, and by the ambitions, fears and self-seekings that such interests breed; smothered by the elaborate theological defences that Christians have built, not against Anti-christ, but against each other; smothered by anxieties, not unnatural in these embroilments, for its own future. If you take Christianity along with its entanglements, encumbrances and unnatural alliances; if you present it with all the secular baggage which the ages have fastened upon it, you will then find it a hopelessly perplexing thing, a thing which neither Reason nor Faith, whether acting singly or in combination, can accept.

But alongside the authorised version, and sometimes hidden within it as an inextinguishable spark of life, Christianity has an unauthorized version, which the former has often repressed, persecuted and condemned to the hangman or to the eternal flames. Of this unauthorized version a fair copy exists in the hearts of men, a fairer copy in the hearts of women, and the fairest copy of all in the hearts of children—for Christianity is pre-eminently a religion of the young. It is the unauthorized version which has kept Christianity alive through the ages and defied the smotherers even to this day.—L. P. Jacks, "Religious Perplexities," pp. 69-74.

If the Church had accepted the teaching of her Lord, had suffered all inevitable persecution for the sake of manifesting in the world God's active generosity to non-Christians and heretics, and had taught a love of God too great and glorious to include resentment, too noble for vengeance, too majestic to punish crimes of *lèse majesté*, what would have been the history of our Western civilization? The Church rejected the national or social aspect of Christian forgiveness, as had the Jewish nation; and the doom of the consequences of that rejection has devastated Christendom again and again—and of late most terribly.—Lily Dougall, "The Salvation of the Nations," *Hibbert Journal*, October, 1921, p. 117.

Internationalism has been, through all the history of the Church, a part of its vital spirit. With all its faults, despite its piteous weaknesses and heinous sins, the Christian Church has acted as a force to draw men together, to make them conscious of a real unity transcending their external differences; to make them dissatisfied with a divided world, restless until there is among the severed parts of humanity an at-one-ment, a reconciliation.—William Pierson Merrill, "Christian Internationalism," p. 66.

We Christians think that in the application of the principle of Christianity to international relations lies the only solution of the problem. . . . Christian internationalism is not easy to achieve. It may not be possible always simply to apply to nations the precepts of Christian morality as they affect individuals. But that should be our endeavor, and it is the duty of every citizen . . . to approach the consideration of international problems with the firm resolve to be guided not by a narrow conception of national interests, but by the broad principles of mercy and pity, of truth and of justice.—Lord Robert Cecil in "World Brotherhood," p. 192.

Has the Christian Church today no great message to proclaim to all the nations, which will preserve all that is really noble in patriotism and in sacrifice for the fatherland? Is it not rather an essential if half-forgotten part of her message that there is a world-wide Kingdom of God, too great and rich for any one nation to express in its completeness, but needing them all, with all their racial differences and historic individualities for its attainment, a real and not simply an ideal commonwealth of all

mankind, slowly working out its vast destinies not in a tame cosmopolitanism, but in a true international life, rich in its very antagonisms because held together in a deeper unity in God?—D. S. Cairns, "An Answer to Bernhardi," p. 15, 16.

If we consider the causes of our public troubles, whether with other nations or arising out of our internal conditions, we shall find that they have nothing to do with Christianity, which, if it had had a fair trial, would have prevented or cured them all, but that they arise, on the contrary, from principles of conduct which are flatly contrary to Christianity. The acute rivalry between nations, which on the whole share the same civilization, arises from a perverted and exaggerated patriotism, which is expressed in the heathenish sentiment, "My country right or wrong." Our recent enemies carried this false ideal further than we ever did and even declared explicitly that there is no such thing as international morality—a most shocking view, which governments have often acted on, but have seldom or never avowed till now. It is combined with a hatred and contempt for other nations and with a complete denial of any moral obligations to those people outside Europe who are arrogantly called the inferior races. We have here a reversion to the barbarous tribal morality which even the Middle Ages had outgrown. It is unnecessary to argue that it is quite inconsistent with Christianity. "In Christ," says St. Paul, "there is neither Jew nor Greek, barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free." Nationalism is an open revolt against the Gospel, as is the whole theory of superior and inferior races, which is bad science as well as bad religion. Equally unchristian is the desire for territorial expansion without consulting the wishes of the inhabitants. "Take away justice," says St. Augustine, "and what are empires but great acts of brigandage?" The bitter jealousy and competition within our societies in peace time is equally unchristian.

Any fair-minded man must surely see that it is the practical rejection of Christianity and the adoption of quite different ideas which are responsible for our troubles. History has set its condemnation, not on the Gospel of Christ, but against perverted and half-insane national arrogance, against public and private greed, and, amongst other things, against faith in machinery—laws and institutions and policy—for making men better. If you will think of the characteristics of New Testament religion,

as I tried to summarize them just now, I am sure you will be convinced that if any serious attempt had been made to guide the public and private life of Europe in accordance with those ideals, our late troubles would not have occurred. You remember St. Paul's metaphor of a building in I Cor. iii. The builders have brought materials of all sorts, good and bad; and the fire has come which has tried every man's work of what sort it is. What has been burnt is assuredly not the Christian element in our civilization. It is the masonry, daubed with untempered mortar, the wood, hay, and stubble, set up by men who deemed themselves wiser and more practical than Christ.—Dean Inge, in a sermon to Edinburgh students, May 13, 1923.

If we take our position outside the Christian standpoint, Spengler is unconditionally justified in predicting the ruin of Western culture. His theory is that every cultural cycle has its own soul, which determines its peculiar form; that it passes through the successive stages of youth, maturity, old age and death. If we regard history solely from the worldly standpoint, Spengler cannot be refuted. We shall mingle the ruins of our material civilization with those of Nineveh and Babylon. But we should remember that since Christianity came into the world no great nation has been extinguished; or at least no nation vivified by this new spirit has vanished from the earth. The question is, whether Western nations are still in a condition to be saved by that spirit.—From translation of a lecture delivered at Zurich, Switzerland, by Professor Friedrich W. Foerster, *The Living Age*, August 25, 1923, p. 346.

The thought of God often has the most diverse effects on men. It may produce uneasiness, or ridicule, or resentment. But wherever it encounters *faith*, its invariable result is a sense of calm, of largeness, of promise, of resource. To see God, as He appears in Jesus, and to cast oneself upon Him, is to be delivered from the fear of things, and very specially from the fear of tasks that scare us by their size. We get back our nerve as we look at Him. What gives the Bible its majesty of attitude, its perfect self-possession in face of an impossible situation, is just that the writers of the book were all the time looking at God. They lost even the thought of their own weakness as they gazed on the might of the Eternal. Prophet and apostle were more conscious than we can be, how unequal is the ratio

between God's redeeming plan and man's best wisdom or effort, but the sight of the Father's power never failed to steady them. Human slackness, human antagonism, were all to give way, that God might be all in all. . . .

We have to recapture that calm faith; we have to bring out into the forefront of the Christian mind how infinite are our resources in Him who sits upon the throne and is perpetually saying, "Behold, I make all things new."

How are we to discover these resources? How are we to be able to tell with certainty what we can count upon from God? . . . We can ascertain what God is willing to be to us and to do for us, not by speculation, or by guessing—often they are the same thing—but by faith. Only it must be faith in its biggest and deepest sense; and that is looking at God, receiving from Him, and daring for Him. That was the method of St. Paul, it was the method of Livingstone. It was the method, if we may adduce his name, of the Pioneer of Faith, the Lord Jesus Christ Himself. It will suffice for us. There can be no way but this of unsealing for ourselves, and for the cause we care about, the treasures of God's life.—Professor H. R. Mackintosh, D.D., "The Resources of God," in "The Vision of the Kingdom." Report of the Missionary Congress of the Scottish Churches, Glasgow, 1922, pp. 177-178.

We must remember . . . that God has resources that are not committed to our hands. The Christian Church is God's messenger but not his only one. There is no history from which He is absent. When we have done all, we are only part of a greater whole, and many men are serving the will of God who intend nothing of the sort. Those who in Christ's name went out declaring the solidarity of mankind and proclaiming that in Christ there was neither Jew nor Greek, neither male nor female, neither bond nor free, had no idea by what various processes those ancient disabilities were to be removed—by the merchant's enterprise, by the explorer's courage, by the ambitions of kings and the needs of common men, by hunger for knowledge and thirst for adventure. All the Church's missionary work looked to a situation out of men's sight, but it was the situation in which we stand today.

Our fathers proclaimed that all mankind was one, but they proclaimed it in faith, for the facts all looked the other way. Now, every thinking person can see that they were right. We

know that we are so much members of one another that we must learn how to live together or we shall perish together. The old cleavages are not only displeasing to God; they are the problems of statesmen, for they are now seen to be ruinous to society and to civilization. As we look back upon the past, as Christian people, it is only our prudences and parochialism of which we feel ashamed; only our most daring ventures that stand justified. We have been disillusioned: many prophecies of steady and cautious progress look foolish enough now. We only know that if we keep the way of faith, we shall find that we come where all the roads meet, and that there are chariots and horsemen, not of our raising, sent to our aid, and the kingdoms of this world shall become the Kingdom of our God and of His Christ.—Rev. W. R. Maltby, "The Resources of God," in "The Vision of the Kingdom," pp. 183, 184. (Report of the Missionary Congress of the Scottish Churches, Glasgow, 1922.)

All of us here are no doubt vividly conscious of the appalling intellectual confusion and moral anarchy among Christian peoples in face of the present disintegration of European society. I want to suggest that this may partly be explained by a conception of the nation-state that dominated the mind of the Western nations toward the end of the last century—namely, that the national group was the *final unit* of social organization, and the *sole judge* of issues arising between it and other national groups. This conception came to rule men's minds so completely that great bodies of Christians who still continued to give their vocal allegiance to God had in fact already denied Him their supreme loyalty and had transferred this to the nation. In the face of this betrayal, the Church was on the whole quite impotent and unable to create among its members any common mind which might have been opposed to the impending cataclysm. This impotency of the Church was partly due to the divisions along state lines which followed the Reformation, and partly to the fact that while such a conception of the nation was being disseminated, the Church was so completely preoccupied with defending its dogma from the supposed attacks of science that it was quite unconscious that the first allegiance of its members was gradually being transferred to another object.

The consequences of the triumph of this conception of the nation were that the Western world tended to become spiritually

separated into watertight compartments each occupied by an extremely zealous, suspicious, sensitive and aggressive patriot, scheming to enlarge his compartment at the expense of his neighbor's; and that no moral order was recognized as existing above the nation by which national actions might be judged. It seems probable that historically the conception of the nation as the final unit of society is erroneous, and that it is certain that the conception of it as sole judge in its own causes is morally pernicious. We as Christians know that there is a moral order above the nation, and that there is such a thing as corporate sin. Hence we must deny once and for all that dastardly fiction that foreign policy has nothing to do with morality, but must be determined only by "national interests." So it becomes our imperative duty to scrutinize the decisions of our own foreign offices in the light of the moral law, and wherever we detect an action that contravenes that law to brand it as immoral. If we do not we shall ourselves become morally dead.

I do not mean to imply that we must be anti-nationalists. The nation is serving its appointed place in the education of mankind, and many of the richest things in life come through our heritage in it. Everything that is good in our national life we will wish to retain and develop, not however for its own sake, but in order that it may be used in the service of the rest of the world—a service rendered in such a way that it will not impede the similar development of any other nation. Our supreme loyalty can no longer be given to the national group. Our loyalty to it will continue but only as it is merged in a higher loyalty.

This does not mean an insipid cosmopolitanism of the Goethe-Rousseau variety. Far from it. It means that we must consecrate ourselves in a fearless effort to the discovery of the consequences of our faith in Christ when applied to the corporate life of the world. The time has come when for the salvation of our own souls we must give our minds to discovering what some of these consequences are.

The continuance of the reality of our faith in Christ is conditioned by this. We believe in God the Father from whom every family in heaven and on earth derives its name and nature. We believe in a divine purpose running through all creation and culminating in the Son of God who was also the Son of Man—revealing both what God is and what man must strive to become. We believe in the ultimate establishment of the Kingdom

of God, and that its citizens are those who have found the way of the Cross—"He that loseth his life shall find it."

In the light of this faith we as members of the Federation must dedicate ourselves to the task of reasserting the triumph of the Reign of God over nationalistic ambitions. We must so witness for Christ that we will create a body of men in the various nations whose mental habits, mode of thought, sympathies and imagination mark them as more interested in the mutual contributions which varying national types can make to each other than in the assertion of one type at the expense of other types—men who in their cares and outlook are concerned primarily with the common good of all peoples, and who have learned "to keep an eye out for the interests of others as well as for themselves." In matters that concern all nations we can no longer think as Americans or Germans but as members of the one family of men.

And what is the task which such men have before them? (1) To break down the walls of suspicion between peoples and create a mutual spirit of actual good-will. Nothing will contribute so much to this end as our resolute refusal to generalize about other nations—to condemn a whole people or to judge it by one or two individuals. (2) To help discover a spiritual basis for the world society, and contribute in every possible way to the rapprochement of the various branches of the Church. (3) To study what the mind of Christ is in regard to matters with which the corporate life of the world is primarily concerned.—Francis P. Miller, From a speech delivered at Hardenbroeck, Holland, September 7-12, 1921.

The sum of the whole matter is this, that our civilization cannot survive materially unless it be redeemed spiritually. It can be saved only by becoming permeated with the spirit of Christ and being made free and happy by the practices which spring out of that spirit. Only thus can discontent be driven out and all the shadows lifted from the road ahead.—Ex-president Woodrow Wilson, "The Road Away from Revolution," pp. 12, 13.

CHAPTER XIII

SELECTED READINGS

The greatest task that lies before our generation is not the perfecting of international relations or the establishment of a

new and juster social system. It is the understanding of Jesus. —Alfred E. Zimmern, "The Rediscovery of Jesus," *Century*, December, 1923, p. 269.

It would be an affectation to suggest that this subject [non-resistance] does not raise questions of the greatest practical importance for the present age; no one is justified in evading the issues presented. The teaching of Jesus represents a non-resistant attitude which has come to be described as "pacifist," and the world has just passed through a crisis which has proved that "pacifism" and "non-resistance" are impossible policies. What does this mean for those who profess and call themselves Christians? It cannot mean that they ought to adopt a non-resistant policy either in personal or in national affairs, for experience (which has, after all, some merit) seems to prove that the policy of not resisting evil leads to its triumph rather than its defeat. But this fact gives no justification for explaining away or watering down the plain and intelligible teaching of Jesus. It was his teaching; it may have been right and wise for his immediate hearers; but it is not wise or right as the general basis of conduct, whether personal or national. If Jesus intended to lay down a general principle of conduct we have to admit that he was wrong, or adopt the pacifist position. There is nothing in the context to suggest that he thought of a limited application of his words, nor in the days of persecution which followed did Christians so interpret him. If, therefore, he was wrong it is necessary to ask how we can explain the error. —Kirsopp Lake, D.D., "Landmarks in the History of Early Christianity," pp. 25, 26.

There is nothing that so lifts Jesus in the ranks of the world's great thinkers as this slightly but definitely indicated perception of his that the reorganization of the psyche is not of itself sufficient to set up the necessary reactions of organic social change. Buddha and Mohammed missed it altogether. Neither Plato nor Aristotle suspected that the operations of group-mindedness are of another sort than individual thinking, or that the pooled cognition of the socially coordinated group is something other than the sum of private cerebrations. So far as our own thinking goes, the idea is so new that though the operation of the group mind is generally conceded by psychologists as constituting a new field of inquiry, we have as yet no adequate terminology under

which group-mindedness may be discussed. Nor did Jesus supply us with even a phrase more definite than "behold, the kingdom of God is within you," which, though it surely places the hope of social regeneration in the field of group psychology, where after two thousand years we have discovered it to be, maps out no line of procedure by which it may certainly be realized. The superiority of Jesus to all ancient thinkers lies in the certainty with which He located the seat of possible realization of the kingdom, and in the simplicity with which He accepted the idea of progressive revelation, as his own notion of the scope of his teaching broadened, first to include the Gentiles and then all the nations of the earth. . . . Jesus was never disconcerted by delay, finding always the necessary illumination a little in advance of the event, and satisfied to refer his disciples not to any pattern of his own making, but to that same source from which they were to draw all that was necessary for the "greater things" they were to do after Him. In this He differed immortally from Plato and Marx and the rest of the Utopians, who, assuming that enough is already known of man to insure a successful arrangement of his interests, offered us set patterns that experience and instinct widely reject.—Mary Austin, "Do We Need a New Religion?" *The Century*, September, 1923, pp. 758, 759.

The prophetic vision of a "martyr nation" has long haunted the imagination of the Society of Friends. Let some one people set the brave example of total disarmament, beat its cannon into ploughshares and turn its ironclads into floating sanatoria, and await, unprepared and unresisting, the effect of its splendid example. It is an alluring suggestion, and on one condition it would probably not involve any considerable risk. If we [the British] attempted to retain our colonies and dependencies, while we disarmed at home, we should at once be dismembered and overrun by stronger powers. The millionaire who left his door ajar would certainly be robbed. The cottager may sleep secure by the high road without locks and bars. If we chose to be simply an unarmed and unaggressive island on the confines of Europe, we should have nothing to fear.—H. H. Brailsford, "The War of Steel and Gold," p. 171.

I am convinced that in days to come the same intellectual and spiritual labor that is now devoted to engineering problems will

be perforce diverted to the greater problem of conquering the discords that now divide individuals, and social classes, and nations; and I believe that when that time comes we shall find the Sermon on the Mount not only divine truth, but also mundane truth. There are two ways of fighting evil: I can fight the evil outside me by striking wildly about me and giving free rein to all the combative passions in my own bosom; or I can follow another plan and fight first the evil in myself, weigh my own responsibility and guilt, and thus set an example for others to do the same. That is the principle of the Sermon on the Mount.—Extract from translation of a lecture delivered at Zurich, Switzerland, by Professor Friedrich W. Foerster, *Living Age*, August 25, 1923, pp. 346, 347.

One does not need to look very far to find the reason for the antagonism to Jesus. Was it not he who in the midst of the brewing rebellion was teaching:

That ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also.
(Matthew 5:39.)

It was Jesus who was teaching:

But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you.
(Matthew 5:44.)

Under the circumstances, therefore, those who understood and followed Jesus were certain of meeting violent antagonism from a people that was on the eve of rebellion and disaster. Political passions were, of course, clothed in traditional religious terms. Messianic hopes in no wise changed the tribal traditional morality of the people: such hopes rather enhanced it. What then could save the people? Only that great spiritual experience, the passionate and humble submission to the will of God; only a rebirth in spirit could save them from their traditional reactions. Without this new glowing spirit, the old tribal morality, the standards of flesh were sure to prevail.—Vladimir Simkhovitch, "Towards the Understanding of Jesus," pp. 53, 54.

We shall now seek to justify the statement that the repentance preached by Jesus was a national change of mental attitude and

of conduct. He foretold a universal salvation, allying himself with the great prophets; and the reformation he preached was to be an international salvation because it was first national. In the same sense his reformation was intended to be national because it was first individual. The individual was to win his soul by acting always as it behooved a member of the nation to act—acting as he told them their God acted. A nation of men thus acting was to win the world, to be the stone that “cut without hands” would smite and change the world-order. . . . John taught that the Jews had only to be forgiven by God to be saved; Jesus taught that salvation consisted in forgiving and blessing the inimical world.

The distinction between individual and national morality, so much considered since nationalism came to its present emphasis in Western Christendom, was not a possible thought to a Jew of that time.—Lily Dougall and Cyril Emmet, “The Lord of Thought,” pp. 136, 137.

When . . . Jesus taught the forgiveness of enemies, the iniquity of judging one’s fellow-men, the absurdity of trying to correct their vision when the vision of the would-be correctors was obscured by conceited ignorance of the true character of God, he was not mainly teaching what ought to happen between brother and brother in one nation or between friend and friend in some isolated assembly of the elect—that peaceable conduct was a duty in such cases had already been amply taught among the Jews—he was teaching the right individual attitude towards every enemy, personal or national, and the right national attitude towards an enemy nation.—Lily Dougall and Cyril Emmet, “The Lord of Thought,” p. 147.

To the powerful Roman nation the Christian message was subversive of its whole social and industrial system; to the Jew it was subversive of all religious teaching.

The slave, the backward races, to have the same freedom of life as the “civilized” Roman—the cultured, the educated, who knew, of course, how to use their freedom rightly—away with such a thought! The Gentile, the heathen, men of all nations in the world—to have the same opportunities, the same spiritual rights, as they—the Jews, the chosen nation, who had far greater knowledge of the way of God than any other? Impos-

sible!—Edith Picton-Turbervill, "Christ and International Life," pp. 62, 63.

To any mind of real statesmanlike insight, at the time when Jesus taught, it must have been clear that the doom of Jerusalem and of the Jewish state was assuredly imminent unless the whole nation changed its fierce, inimical attitude to the Gentile world. On the other hand, it would have been no less clear that the obliteration of the purest conception of a personal God ever known to the world would ensue if the upholders of the Jewish faith made compromise with the worship of Caesar, or even with the worship of the impassible Stoic deity who stood nearest to Jehovah in ethical character. The only way in which both the religious ideal and the national integrity of the Jews could together be saved was by raising the religious ideal to a point at which entire friendliness with, and active benevolence toward, the Gentile world would be consistent with perfect and enthusiastic loyalty to the God of the Jews. *Jesus presented a conception of God which made this dual salvation possible—and obligatory.* He proclaimed a new Divine character. He said that it was the glory of the perfection of God to forgive His enemies *while they still remained inimical*; to lavish kindness upon them. Loyalty to this God involved the generous and active benevolence of every Jew toward every enemy with whom he came in contact. Can we doubt that this policy of international friendship was one which, however it might have been misunderstood and persecuted at first, would inevitably have saved the Jewish nation from the impending political annihilation, and ultimately would have won to the Divine allegiance all the good-hearted of the earth?—Lily Dougall, "The Salvation of the Nations," *Hibbert Journal*, October, 1921, p. 116.

The first credential of every living movement in civilization is the capacity for sacrifice which it is able to create, sacrifice at whatever cost for the ends believed in. Even the creed of war demanding as it has continuously done the greatest sacrifice of which human nature is capable for its cause, was immeasurably nobler and greater than the creed of peace as thus declared.—Benjamin Kidd, "The Science of Power," p. 144.

It is evident that Palestine at the time of Christ was in turmoil. Seldom in its long history had it been more disturbed

than in his day. Hatred begets hatred. Contempt breeds contempt. Every man's hand seemed to be against his neighbor. The Romans, although they did not oppose Hellenic influence, doubtless kept together, as conquerors in an alien land will always do. The Greeks and other races combined among themselves. The Jews, though united in their hatred of the Gentile, were always divided internally, and perpetually wrangling in their schools. In their eyes no man was a patriot unless also an orthodox Jew, and this invariably involved contempt for men of other nations.

In the midst of all this came Jesus of Nazareth with his universal message. There was as much strained feeling in Palestine then as there is in Europe today. The Judaizing section bitter, strong and intriguing; the Romanizing section determined, tyrannical; the Hellenizing section subtle and insinuating. Hatred and suspicion were rife, all were fighting for their own hand. Into the very thick of all this strife came Christ, proclaiming a challenge and an amazing message: so idealistic that surely it was hopeless even to attempt to obey. "Love your enemies, do good to them which hate you. As ye would that men should do unto you, do ye also to them likewise. Love your enemies . . . and ye shall be called the children of the Highest, for He is kind unto the unthankful and to the evil." What He has to say is not only sublime in its ethics, but universal in its application. Christ's message, the liberty He comes to bring, is obviously for all men of all nations. He dares to speak of a common Father of all these warring peoples. He includes even the Samaritan, and his hearers are dumb. The Gentile Greek who worships the abominable Bacchus and the god Pan, He includes, and that in no dogmatic spirit. Through his teaching runs the thought, so alien to the Jews of old, so alien to many Christians today, that God has not made nation to dominate nation, but endowed them so that each is the complement of the other.—Edith Picton-Turbervill, "Christ and International Life," pp. 57, 58.

It requires no strained interpretation to find in the words of Jesus those great principles of social relationship which every thinking Christian man knows must characterize any regenerated social order. The principles and the sense of values are there: the forms and processes are not. To say that Christianity is a religion of individual salvation, but not of the salvation of

the social order, involves the assumption that within the first of these fields it gives us detailed guidance, while in the second it gives us nothing. In reality it gives us broad principles for both individual and social morality, but details and rules and programs for neither.

It is true that Jesus did not give, nor have his followers with unanimity agreed upon, a specific technique by which the general principle and attitude of good-will, or good social intentions, can pass over with complete success into good social arrangements. It is equally true that the formulae for individual salvation, in the terms of which they are given by Jesus and those who were nearest to him, do not translate themselves automatically into the idiom of actual life under specific concrete situations. Problems of individual morality cannot ordinarily be settled by reference to chapter and verse, any more than problems of social reconstruction. . . .

The problem of a reconstruction of society into a form more consistent with our highest appreciation of man and our most Christian attitudes, does not demand a new revelation or a new religion. It does require that the religion that we have, which we think is quite adequate so far as religion can be adequate if we will take it seriously, shall be supplemented by a scientific technique of social organization. This does not require revelation; it requires intelligence. The religion of Jesus will furnish principles, motives and an emphasis on human values; it must be the business of economists, political scientists and sociologists to find the methods by which these principles can be embodied and these values conserved.

If these do not do their work well, or if they do not at once come to agreement, or if members of the church following the lead of different thinkers cannot agree upon one program of social reform, the blame does not rest upon the Christian religion. The need is not for a new religion to take the problem off our hands and tell us exactly what to do, but for a continual revival of the spirit of good-will, which was the spirit of Jesus, plus a continuing effort through intelligent research and experimentation to develop an improved technique of social living.—*Christian Century*, August 30, 1923, p. 1093.

Consider what international life might be if the ethic of the teaching of Jesus were taken as a national rule of life. Every individual in the nation would need to be generous in his thought

and action to every alien and every alien nation. It would not mean a lack of affection for his own nation or lack of care for its interest. The Golden Rule recognizes the solidarity of human welfare. Each man would say: My nation will suffer if other nations are degraded, but equally other nations will suffer if mine declines. It would be the general discovery of the great secret that human welfare depends on co-operation, not on rivalry.

Had the Jewish nation *in this sense* accepted Christ, and understood, as in that day it alone could understand, his thought, the Western world, conquered from the first by a campaign of international good-will, might have become a Christendom worthy of the name, might long have been what today our greatest optimists hope it may yet become. If the Christian Church, from the first and consistently, had taught all organized groups to forgive their group enemies and do good in return for injury, the prayer that God's will be done on earth as in heaven could not have been the mockery that strife has made it. There has always existed in the Christian archives such knowledge as might have made the imitation of and worship of the Lord a world-saving power.

Group anger and hatred, group malice and uncharitableness, have always been the causes and results of group enmities and national wars. These are personal emotions that are forbidden by Christ. Violence in the interim may be necessary, violence may at times be the truest kindness. War carried on in the spirit of genuine Christian humility and loving kindness, *if such were possible*, might be a saving force; it would be local and brief. But the Church has not lived up to the light she might have had. She has preferred in this respect the Old Testament morality to the morality of Christ; and the great Greco-Roman civilization went down; and the second great Western civilization is now in peril; and the Church has not made the temper of international good-will a *sine qua non* of the Christian life.

Again, Jesus was loyal to his nation. Such a saying as, "I am not sent but to the lost sheep of the house of Israel," could not have become part of the canon if it had not reflected a true tradition. By being a nationalist, Jesus showed how love of nation could be sublimated in the highest service of God and of the world. The Church, on the other hand,

sought to build a cosmopolitan empire. This fell apart when, in the development of human life, national group-feeling became stronger than loyalty to the hierarchy. What was the tie of the Holy Roman Empire worth when our modern nations developed? National churches came into existence, though all professed a common loyalty to the tie of Christian love. What was that tie worth when the noise of war was heard in 1914?

But, taught by recent disaster and present danger, we know now, all of us, that, by the grace of God, there may be a national charity that will think no evil of other nations, which will not vaunt itself, which will render good for evil, and be ambitious only to add most to the universal welfare. If we hope to save the civilization of Western Europe by using Christ's method, we need to realize that a man has no right to call himself by the name of Christ who does not throw the weight of his citizenship on the side of international generosity, international charity, international forgiveness.

I would submit that it is only thus that Christianity can become what we believe it was in the mind of its Divine Founder—a universal and permanent religion.—Lily Dougall, "Christianity and the Western World," *Modern Churchman*, October, 1922, pp. 338, 339.

CHAPTER XIV

SELECTED READINGS

The notion of a sheep's paradise like that [a warless world] revolts, they [the militarily patriotic] say, our higher imagination. Where would be the steeps of life? If war had ever stopped we should have to reinvent it, on this view, to redeem life from flat degeneration. . . . It [war] is an absolute good, we are told, for it is human nature at its highest dynamic. Its "horrors" are a cheap price to pay for rescue from the only alternative supposed, of a world of clerks and teachers, of coeducation and zeophily, of industrialism unlimited and feminism unabashed. No scorn, no hardness, no valor any more! Fie upon such a cattle yard of a planet!—William James, "The Moral Equivalent of War," p. 8.

Our ancestors have bred pugnacity into our bone and marrow and thousands of years of peace won't breed it out of us. . . . The

popular imagination fairly fattens on the thought of wars. Let public opinion once reach a certain fighting pitch and no ruler can withstand it.—William James, "The Moral Equivalent of War," p. 6.

Mankind increases in volume, and in accumulated knowledge, and in a comprehension of the forces of nature; but the intellects of individual men do not grow. . . . The disproportion between the individual ruling men with their personal prejudices and proclivities, their selfish interests and their vanities, and the immeasurable consequences which follow their individual volitions, becomes more striking and more tragic. As the stage expands, the figures shrink.—James Bryce, "Essays and Addresses in War-time," p. 110.

Other things change. Knowledge increases and wealth increases, but human nature has remained, in essentials, much what it was thirty centuries ago, and is never free from the risk of a relapse into the primal passions, Vanity and Ambition, which may so possess a whole people as to suspend the control of reason.—James Bryce, "Essays and Addresses in War-time," p. 128.

To be sure . . . [arms] have been as often, perhaps oftener . . . [man's] partners in crime; but how difficult it is to think of a single good cause now established which owes nothing directly or indirectly to their service! What form of the Christian religion, for example, is without debt to the sword, were it only for the liberty to express itself? And the influence has been reciprocal. A cause once defended by the sword borrows something from the sword which has defended it—the iron enters into its soul; and the sword borrows something from the cause for which it has been drawn—the soul enters into its iron.—L. P. Jacks, "Arms and Men," *Hibbert Journal*, October, 1918, p. 23.

The statement that a custom, or habit of thought, cannot be changed, because it has been persisted in and acted upon for ages, has been made—and vehemently made—whenever men have struggled for an advance in freedom of thought and life. Its falseness has been proved so often, that it is difficult to believe there can be many people today so blind to the facts of history, and of human experience, as to reiterate it.—Edith Picton-Turbervill, "Christ and International Life," p. 100.

The increasing interval between civilization and savagery does not depend upon inborn heredity. The science of civilization has almost nothing to do with the facts of inborn heredity. So far from civilization being practically unchangeable or only changeable through influences operating slowly over long periods of time, the world can be changed in a brief space of time. Within the life of a single generation it can be made to undergo changes so profound, so revolutionary, so permanent, that it would almost appear as if human nature itself had been completely altered in the interval. . . .

If the incoming generation of men were submitted to a new collective inheritance, including in particular its psychic elements, they would take it up as readily as they did the old. We should then have the surprising spectacle of a great change in the world, appearing to the observer as if a fundamental alteration in human nature had suddenly taken place on a universal scale.—Benjamin Kidd, "The Science of Power," pp. 105, 106, 114.

One of the most fertile sources of error in modern political thinking consists, indeed, in the ascription to collective habit of that comparative permanence which only belongs to biological inheritance. A whole science can be based upon easy generalizations about Celts and Teutons, or about East and West, and the facts from which the generalizations are drawn may all disappear in a generation. National habits used to change slowly in the past, because new methods of life were seldom invented and only gradually introduced, and because the means of communicating ideas between man and man or nation and nation were extremely imperfect; so that a true statement about a national habit might, and probably would, remain true for centuries. But now an invention which may produce profound changes in social or industrial life is as likely to be taken up with enthusiasm in some country on the other side of the globe as in the place of its origin. A statesman who has anything important to say says it to an audience of five hundred millions next morning and great events like the Battle of the Sea of Japan begin to produce their effects thousands of miles off within a few hours of their happening. Enough has already occurred under these new conditions to show that the unchanging East may tomorrow enter upon a period of revolution, and that English indifference to ideas or French military ambitions are

habits which, under a sufficiently extended stimulus, nations can shake off as completely as can individual men.—Graham Wallas, "Human Nature and Politics," pp. 154, 155.

He who expects political and social benefits is bound to expect along with them corresponding political and social obligations. We cannot all have our own way independently, or else everything would at once fall into anarchy and chaos. Each must sacrifice something of what he considers to be the best way if there is to be corporate life at all. He may hold that the morality imposed upon him by the state is not so high as to reach his own individual standard, but it is in general his duty to work with it loyally though for him it is but a second best. . . . A recent author has said that Christianity demands that no man do anything of which his conscientious judgment is not persuaded. This statement, however, undoubtedly needs qualification. A man may be persuaded that the drink traffic and war are immoral, and yet may be living in a land where he is forced to enjoy state benefits which are paid for by the customs and excise, and the protection of an army for whose maintenance he pays taxes.—John Kelman, "Some Aspects of International Christianity," p. 78.

The progress of the world has been due to those who, refusing all compromises, have reached out boldly towards the ideal.—Rt. Rev. William Temple, Bishop of Manchester, "Christianity and War," p. 11.

To heal the sickness of the world there is more needed than loans, or credits, or moratoriums. We must have, and must show, confidence in the human virtue of the human being.—Langdon Mitchell, *Atlantic Monthly*, April, 1923.

It is only those still bound in the tradition of the elders—the tradition of tit for tat, the tradition of an eye for an eye, of rebuff for rebuff, of slight for slight, of scorn for scorn—who, in the secular departments of life, reject the doctrine that in friendship and co-operation alone will the salvation of the world be found.—Lily Dougall, *Hibbert Journal*, October, 1921. pp. 120, 121.

A world-peace can be established only by the operation of a world public opinion. . . . The peoples of the world never really desire war, and it always arises either from some inter-

national misunderstanding or from the ambition of a relatively small group of men. Unless this postulate is true, it must be admitted that there is no hope for . . . the future of civilization. If it be really true that men are so mad that a majority or even a large fraction of civilized mankind do desire war for its own sake, then undoubtedly wars will occur. But if that be not true, if on the contrary it be true, as it surely is, that every thinking man and woman must passionately desire peace, then it would seem that if you can only secure time for men's passions to cool before they engage in war and opportunity for them to know the full facts of any international dispute, their common sense will ensure the preservation of peace.—Lord Robert Cecil, "World Brotherhood," p. 191.

Both world and Church seem to have come to a grave misunderstanding of what the Christian virtues of meekness, love, penitence and humility really mean. As used and exemplified by Christ they do not mean keeping out of trouble, minding your own business or consoling yourself with the sweetness of contrition.

His doctrine of non-resistance did not mean letting evil go unchallenged. The attitudes of Christ led Him to storm the fortress of evil with nothing but the truth on his side, to place Himself athwart the forces of evil without protection or means of defence, sure in the triumphs of spiritual powers and careless of what happened to Him. In short it was just a glorious example of Nietzsche's axiom, "Live dangerously." Christ's attitude is a sublime expression of courage and heroic adventure; He is willing to feel deeply, and to feel all; to bear sin that he may take it away; to engage the total forces of pride and power with humility and meekness; to impress himself upon the world for all time without self-assertion and by no other means than that of unarmed and unaided love. . . .

Our belief in God must be capable of dispensing with signs or rewards. We must be able to challenge the whole existing order of things and be confident, even if all our hopes go down in tragedy, that the future holds the victory. Only out of such a spirit will there be born methods and means with the daring, the idealism and the dramatic venture necessary to save the world.—W. E. Orchard, "The Real War," pp. 13, 14.

Something more adventurous than protests against war or proposals for disarmament may have to be undertaken. The

Church will have to make it clear that she is prepared to dispense with the protection of force altogether, and she may perhaps have to stand apart from any state that appeals to force. If even the nations determined upon war, the Church ought to be ready to mobilize her armies, and if needs be, show herself willing to perish on the battlefield before the hostile armies can reach one another. The good soldier of Jesus Christ must be prepared to pay the same price as the good soldier of the state. Some act on the plane of actualities analogous to that in which Christ laid down his life for the world must be taken by the Church or by some section or order within the Church, before the world can finally be saved from war.—W. E. Orchard, "The Real War," p. 16.

The impulse to quarreling and self-assertion, the pleasure of getting one's way in spite of opposition, is native to most men. It is this impulse, rather than any motive of calculated self-interest, which produces war, and causes the difficulty of bringing about a world-state. And this impulse is not confined to one nation; it exists, in varying degree, in all the vigorous nations of the world.

But although this impulse is strong, there is no reason why it should be allowed to lead to war. It was exactly the same impulse which led to duelling; yet now civilized men conduct their private quarrels without bloodshed. If political contest within a world-state were substituted for war, imagination would soon accustom itself to the new situation, as it has accustomed itself to absence of duelling. Through the influence of institutions and habits, without any fundamental change in human nature, men would learn to look back upon war as we look upon the burning of heretics or upon human sacrifice to heathen deities.—Bertrand Russell, "Why Men Fight," pp. 113, 114.

Let me not content myself, in response to these critics, with the easy answer, that, if our aims are visionary, impracticable, Utopian, then the unfulfilled promises of the Scriptures are vain—then the Lord's Prayer, in which we ask that God's Kingdom may come on earth, is a mockery—then Christianity is no better than the statutes of Utopia. Let me not content myself with reminding you that all the great reforms by which mankind have been advanced encountered similar objections—

that the abolition of the punishment of death for theft, so long delayed, was first suggested in the "Utopia" of Sir Thomas More—that the efforts to abolish the slave-trade were opposed, almost in our day, as visionary—in short, that all endeavors for human improvement, for knowledge, for freedom, for virtue, all the great causes which dignify human history, and save it from being a mere protracted War Bulletin, a common sewer, a *Cloaca Maxima*, flooded with perpetual uncleanness, have been pronounced Utopian—while, in spite of distrust, prejudice, and enmity, all these causes gradually found acceptance, as they gradually came to be understood, and the aspirations of one age become the acquisitions of the next.—Charles Sumner, "War System of the Commonwealth of Nations" (1849), p. 143.

Given the nature of man, war results from the spiritual condition that follows real or fancied injury or insult. It is a familiar observation that in most wars each side believes itself to be right and both pray with equal sincerity for the blessing of heaven upon their arms. Back of this there must lie a mistake. However much ambition, trade competition or sinister personal motives of whatever kind, may have led towards the warlike situation, two great bodies of human beings, without whose consent war cannot be carried on, can never have come to two diametrically opposed genuine beliefs as to the justice of the quarrel without one side or the other, and probably both, being mistaken about their country's rights and their country's duties.

When foreign affairs are ruled by democracies the danger of war will be in mistaken beliefs.—Elihu Root, *Foreign Affairs*, September 15, 1922, pp. 4, 5.

Christianity says that if you follow the Christian way you will in time see that it is absurd to make the struggle for life your business. You will see that you yourself are absurd so long as you are absorbed in yourself and the prolongation of your existence. As it is with men so it is with nations. Apply the Christian teaching to them and it will destroy the belief in their necessary rivalry, just as much as if they were individual men. Christianity tells us that we should not love ourselves, but other men; and so it tells us, not that we should not love our own country, for that consists of other men beside ourselves, but that we should love other countries too. For the diversity of mankind

and of all created things is the very occasion of love and if we are to love at all we must love what is different from ourselves. We have our idea of a country taken from our own, and the barbaric and heathen notion is that we should hate other countries and the ideas taken from them.—A. Clutton-Brock, "The Cure for War," pp. 13, 14.

A serious mistake, common among peace-loving and internationally minded folk in the days before the war, was that of facing the task of international organization with an easy optimism. We believed in the reasonableness of human nature. We did not appreciate how unreasonable men are, or how tenacious are the roots of old prejudices and passions and points of view. If the war has rendered no other service, at least it has opened our eyes to the serious nature of the task confronting forward-looking men, has aroused in us a wholesome conviction that no progress can be made toward a lasting peace without a frank and resolute facing of the difficulties in the way.—William Pierson Merrill, "Christian Internationalism," p. 113.

Universal peace can be secured in only one way—by raising the mind of civilization, through the emotion of the ideal conveyed to the rising generation by the collective inheritance, to a plane where the barbarism of war would be so abhorrent to it that the degradation of engaging in it would take away from a people that principal motive of self-respect which makes life worth living.

Given clear vision in the general mind, this cultural inheritance, utterly impossible as it might seem, could be imposed on civilization in a single generation. . . . It is evident on reflection that there is no goal to which the emotion of the ideal thus directed is not capable of carrying the human mind. Fitfully and ignorantly as it has been employed in the past, it is the cause which has been behind all the progress of the world. It is capable of accomplishing any purpose to which it may be steadily directed over long periods of time. It is the nature of the inner vision which it brings into being, that it leaves the possessor never satisfied with the world as it is, and that it drives him through every degree of effort to endeavor to realize his ideal. Evoked under suitable conditions in the mind of the young, it is able to render the successive generations of men upon whom

it acts fixed of purpose, capable of the most surprising labors and sufficient to otherwise impossible measure of self-subordination and self-sacrifice.—Benjamin Kidd, "The Science of Power," pp. 147-149.

The establishment of a sane and real international order is one of those tasks for which faith alone is adequate.—William Pierson Merrill, "Christian Internationalism," p. 129.

In so far as the corruption of the Christian message has not come from the mass of the people, we may have confidence that, for this very reason their voices will cry out for brotherliness, founded on "one blood," rather than for diplomacy, which, in spite of what it professes to achieve, has set nation against nation, and has ever ended in the shedding of blood.—Edith Picton-Turbervill, "Christ and International Life," p. 67.

In every nation in Europe today there are those who are imbued with a passionate belief that international relationships *can* be built on the ethics of Christ, that there is a Power that can quicken the consciences of whole nations, and change even national life and aspirations. It is a time in every nation of rapid movement, quick advancement. There are many thoughtful people today who are persuaded that it is possible, in one generation, for such changes to come to pass in the heart of man, as to cause certain evils in life which have been looked upon as "necessary," to perish. Such changes as will create a new sense of values in national as well as in individual life, nobler ideals in commerce and business, greater comprehension between nations.—Edith Picton-Turbervill, "Christ and International Life," p. 148.

It is sometimes urged that the tendency to war is characteristic of human nature, and that on this account there is no real chance of the end of wars upon the earth. Longinus long ago asserted that "strife is good for mortals," and Bernhardt has most abundantly indorsed his statement. There will always be two types of mind upon this subject. It has been said that to Napoleon war was a splendid game, while to Wellington it was a stern duty to be got through as quickly as possible. But that it is an essential element in human nature, which can never be eradicated or replaced, is an assertion which runs contrary not only to the whole genius of Christianity but to any scientific view of the evolution of the race. To those who on

any ground believe in an ultimate decency of things, war is necessarily doomed. To those who believe in an intelligent and realizing way in Christianity, the question resolves itself into a very simple issue. We may grant a certain truth to the assertion that war is inherent in human nature, which derives this among its many mingled inheritances from the brute; but we must ask the further question, Is Christ or is he not a match for human nature? Can he manage it, and lead it out from the slime of its origins into the nobility of its destiny? Upon that question depends our belief in the failure or success of Christianity. For believers in Christ, to ask that question is already to answer it. We have ground for believing that there is a limit to the reign of brute human nature, that Christ transcends it, and that his ideals, which have already conquered its cruder forms, will ultimately triumph over all things and lead mankind out into the glory and nobility of the sons of God.—John Kelman, "Some Aspects of International Christianity," pp. 119, 120.

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